Florida State University Law Review
Volume 2

Issue 1

Article 2

Winter 1974

Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control
Donald M. Carmichael
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Land Use Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Donald M. Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 35 (1974) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol2/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS AS A
BASIS FOR LAND USE CONTROL
DONALD M.

CARMICHAEL*

It is manifest from this review of our decisions that there has
been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity
of finding ground for a rational compromise between individual
rights and public welfare. The settlement and consequent contraction of the public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing
density of population, the interrelation of the activities of our people
and the complexity of our economic interests, have inevitably led
to an increased use of the organization of society in order to protect
the very bases of individual opportunity. Where, in earlier days, it
was thought that only the concerns of individuals or of classes were
involved, and that those of the State itself were touched only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental interests of
the State are directly affected; and that the question is . .. of the
use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon
which the good of all depends.
-Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes'
The Constitution did not impress upon the states in a rigid
mold either the common-law fuedal system of land tenures or any
of the modified and variant forms of tenure prevailing in the states
in 1789. Rather it left them free to devise and establish their own
systems of property law adapted to their varying local conditions
and to the peculiar needs and desires of their inhabitants.
2
-Justice Wiley Rutledge
I. Two BASIC INADEQUACIES OF POLICE POWER REGULATIONS
OF LAND USE

Regulation under the police power is and will doubtless continue
to be our pervasive method for governmental control of private land
use decisions in this country. It has not worked well, however, due
to fundamental and inherent weaknesses that may become more
troublesome as new social priorities emerge.
A. The Taking Issue
Police power land use regulation typically has direct impact on
Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. A.B., Davidson College, 1958;
LL.B., University of Louisville, 1963; LL.M., University of Wisconsin, 1964.
1. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442 (1934).
2. Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 89 (1948) (dissenting

opinion).
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the major expectations of individuals to develop their land as they
wish. It thus directly confronts the individual landowner's powerful
economic motivations for development. In broader terms, it commonly provides a curb on trends of high profit land use and growth.
Despite these effects, police power regulation makes no provision for
compensation to those regulated. This means that in the case of
each tract of land regulated, some loss in value is ordinarily imposed,
without compensation, in furtherance of the public health, safety,
morals and the general welfare.3 These purposes are sought for the
benefit of the public; the regulations are imposed by the government. The immediate and obvious impact is typically to diminish the
4
value of privately owned property.
At precisely this point, a fundamental constitutional question is
prominently raised. The United States Constitution provides: "[N]or
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. ' ' 5 This provision becomes applicable to police power regulations
when value diminution is imposed on private property by government regulation in the furtherance of public purposes, that is, for
public use. 6 The value diminution could be compensated by the
3. Police power regulation does in some instances, of course, confer quite specific
and major increments of value on particular tracts of land, as when a tract receives
zoning for high-density residential, commercial or industrial use. TIME, Jan. 5, 1968, at 57,
reports the conferring of such increments in the most pure (or impure) form. As a
result of municipal corruption in Islip, N.Y., the properties of favored parties were
given downgraded zoning that created reported profits of $64,000 and $167,000 on two
separate tracts. Id.
4. In classic usage, the imposition of police power regulations prevents use by the
regulated owner that would cause harm. Regulation of the owner's use, causing
diminution of the value of his property, thus ostensibly finds its reciprocal in the
avoidance of harm to others. E. FREUND, THE POuCE Powmt 546 (1905).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision is held to have been incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41
(1897).
6. Mugler v. Kansas. 123 U.S. 623 (1887), is generally considered the foundation of
the applicability of the constitutional provision to the value diminution caused by
police power regulation. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING
IssUE 82-138 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BOSSELMAN]. The interaction of this provision
with the value-diminishing effect of police power regulation will be referred to throughout as the "taking issue."
Extensive and helpful analysis of the conceptual structure of the taking issue
may be found in these recent articles: Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 63; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sax I]; Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sax i]; Van Alstyne,
Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971). BOSSELMAN contains an extensive historical review and
analysis of present developments and trends.
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government and the question thereby obviated, but this simply is not
7
a feature of conventional police power regulation. The absence of
compensation poses a specially troublesome "either/or" choice for
the courts. Either the value diminution is tolerable and the regulation
will stand, or the diminution is intolerable without compensation
and is thus unconstitutional. If the latter, the regulation must be
stricken.8
The extent of value diminution that the courts will permit as
an incident of police power regulations in a specific instance simply
cannot be known in advance. It is an ineffable function of a group
of factors including the necessity and propriety of the ends the regulation seeks to achieve,9 the percentage of value diminution under a
variety of tests, 10 the feasibility and level of remunerative uses left

7. But see notes 37 & 38 infra.
8. See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1964);
Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193
A.2d 232, 241 (N.J. 1963); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587, 591
(N.Y. 1938). But cf. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir.
1972); McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 264 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1953), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 817 (1954); Simon v. Town of Needham, 42 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1942).
9. Thus, when regulations are dominated by a nuisance-curbing function, extremely
high levels of value diminution may be tolerated. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brickyard in residential
neighborhood, diminution from $800,000 to $60,000 upheld); Consolidated Rock Prods.
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
36 (1962) (quarry upwind of community with many people who suffered from respiratory
diseases). The nuisance analogy was, of course, that adopted by the Supreme Court
in its landmark decision recognizing zoning as a permissible genre of police power
regulation. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). Aesthetics
and other forms of amenity-preserving regulation historically have been at the other
end of the spectrum from nuisance regulation in terms of judicially perceived necessity
and propriety, although the perception has shifted in recent times. See Thomas Cusack
Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 198
A.2d 447 (N.J. 1964); Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255 (Ore. 1965). See generally
Anderson, Regulation of Land Use for Aesthetic Purposes-An Appraisal of People v.
Stover, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 33 (1963); Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A
Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 218 (1955).

10. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-97 (1962); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666, 671-72 (Mass. 1965).
Both cases set forth a variety of alternative bases on which diminution in value might
be computed. The authors of two recent major analyses of the taking problem have
noted that perhaps four major tests have been used by the courts to determine
whether governmental actions were impermissibly harsh, absent compensation: (1) the
early test of direct physical invasion or assumption of control; (2) the nuisance abatement test; (3) the diminution of value theory; and, finally, (4) the balancing of loss
to the regulated individual against the general public good derived from the regulation.
See Sax I at 46-60; Michelman, supra note 6, at 1183-201. Each test has major defects,
however, and the taking problem will almost certainly continue to defy all efforts at
synoptic formulation of its complexities. See Sax I, supra; Mikhelman, supra.
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to the owner,"' the apparent individualization of onerous impact without good reason for it2 and the judicial philosophy within the partilcu-

lar jurisdiction. Regulations may validly force the deferment of development for a relatively short period,'3 and may substantially curtail
the manner and intensity of development. 14 Radical curtailment, extended deferral or total denial of development, however, are typical
occasions for judicial invalidation of regulation as impermissibly
harsh, as a "taking" of property.15 Whenever any particularly rigorous
police power regulations are proposed, the taking problem consistently dictates caution, if not timidity, in regulatory approach. 6
The tension arises, then, because land use planning as implemented
by police power regulation inevitably controverts the profit motives
of individual owners, which are finally and solidly bolstered by constitutional safeguards. The constitutional protection should be seen

as affording each landowner a continuous, present-tense right to at
least a moderately remunerative level of land use. In contrast to the
individual, short-range, profit-making values inherent in the constitu11. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Dooley v. Town
Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1964); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666, 671-72 (Mass. 1965); Arverne Bay Constr. Co.
v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587, 591 (N.Y. 1938).
12. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,
193 A.2d 232, 241 (N.J. 1963).
13. See, e.g., Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Ct. App. 1970); Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, 35
Cal. Rptr. 480 (Ct. App. 1963); Padover v. Township of Farmington, 132 N.W.2d 687
(Mich. 1965); Josephs v. Town Bd., 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
14. See, e.g., Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 153 A.2d 415 (Conn. 1959), appeal dismissed,
363 U.S. 143 (1960) (four-acre minimum lot size upheld); Simon v. Town of Needham,
42 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1942) (one-acre minimum lot size upheld); Fischer v. Bedminster
Township, 93 A.2d 378 (N.J. 1952).
15. For examples of judicial invalidation of zoning regulations that rendered land
virtually useless, see Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn.
1964); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,
193 A.2d 232, 241 (N.J. 1963); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587
(N.Y. 1938). For examples of judicial invalidation of efforts to effect radical deferment
of development through zoning, see Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 99 A.2d 112 (Conn.
1953), noted in 52 MsC. L. Rv. 925 (1954); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper,
107 S.E.2d 390 (Va. 1959).
16. This assertion is based on personal experience in law practice, on conversations
with numerous planners and attorneys active in land use controls at the local level
and on the observations of several students engaged in empiric research projects in
the area of land use controls. Even when schemes of land use control are based upon
competent planning and legal advice, invalidation on taking grounds is recognized as
a major pitfall to be guarded against, and a risk that must be run. At the local level,
especially in rural areas where often neither planning nor legal advice is available
at the most sophisticated levels, vague allusions to unconstitutionality and threats of litigation often suffice to cow planning boards and local legislators into acquiescence
to a property owner's wishes concerning the use of his land.
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tional right, planning typically seeks to further broad policies for
long-range patterns of development. Emphasis is consistently on the
placing and pacing of development over time-on the development of
land, ordered by a variety of public value and public efficiency concerns. Between the constitutional scheme and the planning scheme,
then, the frames of reference are incompatible and the tensions inevitable. Until now the practical resolution of the tension assertibly has been
manifested, however, in the form of sprawling, leapfrogging, premature,
ill-coordinated development, despite efforts at regulation. Massive pressure for early development, aided by the constitutional guarantee, has
consistently overridden regulatory schemes that are comparatively
weak, often in conceptual and administrative disarray, and that in any
event operate only in the marginal areas of control clearly or apparently permissible in the face of the constitutional inhibition.
B. Unadjusted Inequities in Land Value as a Result
of Regulation
A pervasive effect of the zoning process is that massive increments
of land value are destroyed, created, transferred and conferred. This
occurs without any effort being made or mechanism being available
to adjust the highly disproportionate land valuations that are produced.

17

When an area is brought under zoning for the first time, it is
assertible that the development potential of all the land within the
area is "pooled." That is, the development potential of each tract
is substantially subordinated to and merged with that of all other
tracts so that the entire area may be planned and zoned as an entity.
This development potential in the "zoning pool" is then allocated
among various tracts within the jurisdiction by the planning and
17. Elements of this perception and a forecast of the consequences emerge with
clarity in the startlingly prescient lower court opinion in Ambler Realty Co. v. Village
of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
It is a futile suggestion that plaintiff's present and obvious loss from being
deprived of the normal and legitimate use of its property would be compensated
indirectly by benefits accruing to that land from the restrictions imposed by the
ordinance on other land. It is equally futile to suppose that other property in
the village will reap the benefit of the damage to plaintiff's property and that
of others similarly situated. The only reasonable probability is that the property
values taken from plaintiff and other owners similarly situated will simply
disappear, or at best be transferred to other unrestricted sections of the Cleveland
industrial area, or at the worst, to some other and far distant industrial area. So
far as plaintiff is concerned, it is a pure loss. . . . In the present case, the
property values are either dissipated or transferred to unknown and more or less
distant owners.
Id. at 315-16.

40

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:35

zoning process. The process eventuates in the zoning map, which
relegates each individual parcel to one or more of the gross categories
of zoning uses.,, The underlying theory would seem to be that there
is some rough reciprocity of both advantages and of detriments at
work throughout the district and that this justifies the pooling and
reallocation function. Whether this be true in either theory or practice,
the reality is that massive value shifts occur.
At the outset of the planning and zoning process, all lands within a jurisdiction, arguably, have some rough entitlement to a fair
share of the development potential of a district. To be sure, some
lands will initially be better suited to higher-value land uses; for
example, lands with ready access to major utility corridors may be
better suited to commercial or industrial development than other
lands. This is not to say, however, that all other lands are totally unsuited to such high-value forms of development or that they should
receive no share of the value-bonus that will derive from such uses.
Neither does initial suitability fully explain another major aspect of
value shifts that regularly occur as a result of zoning.'
Assume that several landowners hold contiguous farm properties in
the path of development and that X is the fortunate one to receive
commercial zoning that will allow his farm to be developed as a
large neighborhood shopping center. Assume further that the lands
of the remaining owners are relegated to moderate-density and lowdensity residential use. X now holds land worth much more per acre
than that held by the remaining owners, and it has become more
valuable by a rather startling process. The property of the remaining
owners, when developed, will doubtless provide much of the customer base for X's commercial property and thus contribute directly to
the value of his property. Further, part of the value of his tract is
attributable to the guarantee of a somewhat exclusive ,commercial
18. The classic exposition of the technique occurs in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 380-82 (1926).
19. It can be argued, of course, that once the original, inequitable land value allocations are assigned by the zoning process, they are thereafter reflected in the price
of the land as zoned and the question therefore becomes moot once the first round
of land sales has taken place. This response begs the question in the first instance and,
further, fails to take account of the frequent modifications and alterations that occur
within zoning systems. In fact, it is quite assertible that the continuing potential to
create, destroy, confer and transfer value within zoning systems after they are initially
instituted is an operative factor underlying much of the judicial unease over the use
of devices to achieve flexibility within zoning systems. See note 3 supra. See generally
1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 5.04-.06, 5.16 (1968) (spot zoning, floating
zoning); 3 id. §§ 14A6, 14.68 (use of variance). For examples of cases and literature that
have grown up around the judicial quest for the chimeral comprehensive plan, see I
id. § 5.02.
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prerogative, a semi-monopoly. His tract attains this position largely
because the remaining properties have been shorn of commercial development potential. Nonetheless, no effort is made to adjust this
disparity in value. Owner X gets full benefit of his windfall profit, and
the less fortunate landowners are left to draw long thoughts about the
police power, or fate, as they prefer.
These shifts in land value have to date apparently been tolerated
as an inherent by-product of the land use allocation function of
zoning. This is not to say, however, that efforts to adjust these shifts
are inconceivable or undesirable; part of the thrust of this article
is that a system of development rights could go far toward making
the needed adjustments. In addition to the historically tolerated allocations of land value, recent cases indicate a trend toward judicial
approval of major new bases for police power regulation that may
exacerbate the problem of inequities in land values.
The orderly pacing and placing of development has been a consistent aspiration and source of frustration for American land use
regulatory systems. 20 In a recent Maryland case, however, the court
upheld the upgrading of a tract from one-half acre minimum lot size
(worth between $3,500 and $8,000 per acre) to two-acre minimum lot
21
size (worth between $2,000 and $3,500 per acre). The upgrading
was imposed to make the tract part of a low-density buffer zone to
preserve Olney, Maryland, as an identifiable community. The town
was suitable for such preservation because of its geographical setting
and natural amenities. 2 2 The eourt held that the zoning upgrade had
23
caused no intolerable diminution in the value of the property. The
court also sustained the upgrading as an implementation of the regional planning concept by which corridors of high-density land
use, radiating from Washington, D.C., would be interspersed with
wedges of low-density land use to provide some relief from amorphous
urban sprawl. Further, high-density municipal areas were to be buffered by low-density surrounding zones, such as the one within which
plaintiff found his lands situated.2 4 In a recent New York case, the
20. See, e.g., Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 99 A.2d 112 (Conn. 1953); Arverne
Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1938); National Land & Inv. Co. v.
Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390
(Va. 1959); Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on
the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 370.
21. Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council. 254 A.2d 700,
706 (Md. 1969).
22. Id. at 703, 705.
23. Id. at 706.
24. Id. at 703, 705. Buffer zones to ease the transition from one use district to the
next have been used ever since their approval in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
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court upheld a municipal land use control system in which the
availability of required residential zoning permits and the approval
of subdivision plats were keyed to the sequential availability of various
municipal services under an orderly capital improvement plan.2 5 The
system has the potential to defer development for as long as 18
years 2 ' although the disappointed property owner is given tax relief
and the ability to accelerate his right to develop by installing services
himself.27
These cases indicate that individual owners may find development
intensity sharply curtailed and the timing of development substantially
postponed because of regional planning and municipal financing considerations that in individual cases may seem quite fortuitous. It is
difficult to say at present whether these cases indicate only the periphery
of the permissible. They in no way address the grossly disproportionate
allocation of entitlements that exist when, for reasons of planning or
the public fisc, one property owner is required to wait years to develop
his land, or permitted to develop only at low density, while another
owner is allowed to start immediate construction of high-rises.
A second major doctrinal base is now emerging as justification for
further rigorous police power regulation of land use. It too will
have substantial impact on the broadly held development expectations
of land owners. First, as exemplified by the ancient maxim, sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, it has always been apparent that certain
uses on one tract might cause spillover consequences on other tracts.
Secondly, even if apparent spillover effects are not clearly present, a
decision to develop land in certain ways often permanently forecloses
other alternative-resource uses of that tract-land can be a marsh or
a subdivision but not both, and if a subdivision, then never again a
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Large-lot zoning has been a staple in the preservation of the
"character" of Eastern metropolitan suburbs. See Simon v. Town of Needham, 42
N.E.2d
516 (Mass. 1942); Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 93 A.2d 378 (N.J. 1952). It is widely
used as a holding device. See Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390
(Va. 1959). Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 A.2d 700
(Md. 1969), however, ratifies in principle the permanent consignment of extensive
tracts of land to low-density buffer zones surrounding high-density urban clusters and
development corridors. The case in effect authorizes the creation by police power of
low-density "greenbelts" in order to give spatial separation from and relief to urban
expansion. This may be highly desirable from a planning perspective. The owner
within such a buffer, however, is told in effect: "You will simply have to absorb a

very substantial loss in the value of your property, in service of the more fortunate owners
and eventual residents within the high-density areas. Your loss will give them spatial

separation and relief."
25.

Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291,

409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
26. Id. at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
27. Id. at 304, 334 N.YS.2d at 155-56.

334 N.Y.S.2d

138, appeal dismissed,
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marsh. Thirdly, some lands are beset by such natural hazards that to
develop the land would cause risk to improvements and perhaps to
human life as well. It is not uncommon for all three consequences to
arise from the decision to develop a single tract. For instance, a decision to fill and develop a large marsh area may have spillover effects
by diminishing the breeding ground for many forms of aquatic life
in an adjoining lake, will almost certainly cause permanent elimination of that area as a marsh, and may provide such poor soil bearing
capacity as to cause major damage to conventional buildings placed
on the land.
Given the combination of an expanding and affluent population
and the technological abilities to effect massive, nearly ubiquitous development of land, the consequences set forth above have been multiplying rapidly. This has been accompanied by the somewhat less
rapid development of abilities to detect and analyze these consequences.
From this synergistic milieu have emerged arresting perceptions of
the degradation and depletion of resources, of widespread risks from28
natural hazards and of the foreclosure of future resource options.
These perceptions and the scientific and legislative responses they
have engendered have precipitated what recent commentators call a
"quiet revolution" in our basic philosophy concerning land resources:
If one were to pinpoint any single predominant cause of the
quiet revolution it is a subtle but significant change in our very
concept of the term "land," a concept that underlies our whole
philosophy of land use regulation . ..
Basically, we are drawing away from the 19th century idea that
land's only function is to enable its owner to make money....
This concern over the interrelatedness of land uses had led to a
recognition of the need to deal with entire ecological systems rather
than small segments of them. ...
...Increasingly the question being asked is not only, "Will this
land?" but "Will this make the
use reduce the value of surrounding
29
best use of our land resources?".

The same authors assert that this change in philosophy is beginning to emerge powerfully in judicial thought concerning the
taking issue.30 They cite several recent cases in which extremely strict
28. See generally THE USE OF LAND: A CrZENS' PoLicY GumE To URBAN GROWTH (W.
Reilly ed. 1973), especially at 75-176, 263-95.
29. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE Quwr REVOLTION IN LAND USE CONTROL
314-18 (1971).
30. BOSSELMAN passim; see F. BOSSFLMAN & D. CALITES, supra note 29.
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police power restrictions forbidding land development have been upheld when the dominant purpose was to preserve land in its natural
condition and thereby to preserve highly valuable natural resource
functions of the land.31 The authors further assert that in such situations the diminution-in-value formulation of the taking issue recedes,
and, instead, the courts justify the regulations by balancing the public
interest in resource preservation against the landowner's asserted right
to destroy natural equilibrium by development? 2 In these instances
the public interest in resource preservation may almost irrebuttably
outweigh the individual owner's right to development, and the regula3
tions may thus be sustained. 3
Although the precedent that has developed deals largely with somewhat special resources s4 analytic techniques exist that would enable
31. BOSSELMAN at 214-35, 260-65, relying chiefly on Just v. Marinette County, 201
N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972), upholding preclusion of land fill in marsh under Wisconsin
shoreland zoning ordinance; Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Cal. App. 1970), upholding interim
preclusion of land fill in San Francisco Bay; In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me.
1973), giving broad approval to a site development review statute (though perhaps the
earlier case of State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) reached a contrary result);
Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor, 293 A.2d 241 (Md.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040
(1972), approving a statute forbidding the dredging of sand and gravel in specified
tidal waters and marshlands; Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d
891 (Mass. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of
Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972); Golden v. Planning Board, 285 N.E.2d 291,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
32. BOSSELMAN at 260-65.
33. A conceptual structure to lend justification to these results has been created in
Sax II. Professor Sax depicts each tract of land as inextricably related to many other
tracts, so that a decision to develop is simultaneously a demand or imposition on
other parcels, causing spillover effects. Sax II at 152-55. From this perspective, regulation
of land is seen not so much as a process of inflicting value diminution on a particular
regulated tract, but as a process of adjusting the demands of various owners to impose
or to be free of spillover effects. Id. at 155-60. The public often asserts such rights
through regulation, as to be free of the spillover effects of air or water pollution,
and secures benefit from the regulation. Id. Public benefit is often so small in individualized amounts, however, that it may seem non-existent or quite clearly outweighed by
the detriment that regulation inflicts on private owners. Id. at 160. Professor Sax suggests
that in many cases, however, if public benefits were considered in the aggregate, they
would be quite substantial and should be allowed to prevail over the normal quantum
of damage inflicted on a private party by regulation. Id. at 157-61. This analysis
would serve to justify noncompensability where regulations protect strongly assertible
and rather clearly defined public rights from the harm that would be caused by the
development of certain sensitive types of private lands, such as wetlands. Development
of such lands causes aggravated spillover damages to publicly held resource values.
34. It is difficult to predict the eventual battle lines of the "quiet revolution."
Perhaps there will emerge generic categories of land resources that are of particular
fragility or value, that occupy keystone positions within ecosystems or that have
particular potential for causing spillover harm if developed. These may then be protected from development with appropriate degrees of. rigor. Perhaps the filling of
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5
considerable broadening of the scope of this genre of regulations.
These techniques could well lead to some broadening of the application of the balancing test analysis sketched above. Vexing problems
of value diminution would again be raised, however. These are scarcely met at either a conceptual or visceral level by the reiteration of the
balancing test.36 In practical effect, many owners will likely find development potential curtailed; some will find it virtually eliminated.
This will occur under the aegis of scientific perceptions, methods of
technical analysis, systems of regulation and formulations of public
policy and legal doctrine that in many cases were virtually unheard
of ten years ago. The redistribution of development value would be
not so much a transfer of value between private property owners, as is
frequently caused by zoning, but rather a reallocation of entitlements
due to the interjection of newly perceived and protected public rights
in developable resources. The fact that these forms of regulation
may be highly meritorious and perhaps long overdue will do little
to lessen the novelty or the poignancy of their impact on individual
wetlands contiguous to watercourses is already one such generic category. See Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr.
897 (Ct. App. 1970); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). But see
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970). If these cases are indicative, rigorous police
power regulation to protect a generic resource category may be upheld in one state,
invalidated in another and upheld to a limited extent in a third. Judicial approval
will doubtlessly be highly variable.
Further, expansion of categories and extension of precedent will certainly be a halting process. For instance, given the physical realities, the lake and bay wetlands
cases immediately above could scarcely be regarded as clear authority for the validity
of similar anti-fill regulations concerning wetlands that do not border on and sustain
ecosystems of major watercourses. Even further removed from the supportive power
of the above precedents, for instance, would be similar anti-development regulations in
areas that contain resource values such as groundwater recharge, marginal deer winter
range or simply the support of a typical prairie and grasslands ecosystem. As resource
value and exigency diminish, it is expectable that harsh regulation would undergo a
correspondingly less sympathetic process of judicial review. Perhaps the taking issue
would re-emerge in the diminution-of-value formulation, rather than the balancing
formulation, with the more frequent occurrence of judicial invalidation of regulations.
35. See, e.g., the analysis reviewed in In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me.
1973), the analytic techniques set forth in I. McHARG, DESIGN wiTH NATURE (1969),
discussed infra, and the system of analysis proposed in Leopold, Clarke, Hanshaw &
Balsley, A Procedure for Evaluating Environmental Impact (U.S. Geological Survey
Circular 645, 1971).
36. As Professor Michelman cogently puts it: "But what, after all, can it mean,
in a society professing the respect for persons which seems centrally implicit in liberal
democratic institutions, to 'weigh individual losses against social gains'?" Michelman,
supra note 6, at 1194. Michelman argues that the balancing test merely discloses whether
a regulation is efficient, not whether compensation should be forthcoming. Id. at 1194-96.
Indeed the use of any very finely tuned balancing of present value diminution against
longterm social opportunity costs-or a similar yardstick-seems a most elusive if not
illusory undertaking.
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property owners. Note that there is again apparently the prospect of
widespread and possibly drastic reduction in the value of property
held by some private owners, with no mechanism for adjustment or
compensation.
Based on the above analysis, it seems that this country is now prepared for, and likely to enter, a new phase of efforts to control the use
of land. Greater demarcation of development areas will probably
occur to prevent amorphous, anonymous sprawl. Deferment of development of sizeable tracts may become prevalent based on the fiscal
burdens of extending municipal services to outlying areas. Sophisticated techniques to make broad, synoptic inventories of the physical
characteristics and resource functions of land may well eventuate in
new generations of regulation in which density of development will
be allocated in sharp variation between more and less amenable
areas. For all of these reasons, sizeable areas may be kept essentially
free of development or their development may be deferred for extended periods as orderly growth occurs elsewhere. Highly disproportionate land valuation would logically result from these processes,
based on physical characteristics, planning and fiscal decisions that
will seem highly fortuitous to the owners of individual tracts involved. Major elements of transferred value will emerge as development densities and timing are shifted about within planning districts.
Some landowners may receive a bonanza of prompt development
authorization while others are relegated to major postponement or
substantial preclusion of development. Underneath all will lurk the
taking issue.
Such systems could theoretically advance under the widespread
use of eminent domain or compensation, through which individual
landowners who are losers in the allocation and timing of development rights would be paid for the relinquishment of their development
expectations.3 7 Fiscal and political reality would seem to preclude the
broad adoption of such plans. Police power regulation with
compensation at the borderline between regulating and taking is an
alternative that likewise poses major fiscal, administrative and political
problems. 8 It seems unlikely that widespread compensation schemes
37. For descriptions and analysis of the English experiment along these lines, see
OUTLINE OF PLANNING LAW (5th ed. 1969); KERRIGAN & JAMES, THE TOWN

HEAP, AN

AND COUNTRY PLANNING AcT, 1954 (1955);

MANDELKER, GREEN BELTS AND URBAN GROWTH

(1962).
38.

Compensated regulation is occasionally created by the courts. See, e.g., Lomarch

Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 237 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1968), in which the court engrafted
a limited compensation principle onto the use of the official mapping device. A
thorough plan for compensated regulation is constructed in Krasnowiecki & Paul, The
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will be adopted, either to redress the pervasive disparities of value
created by our present and emergent systems of land use controls, or
to palliate the taking problem.
In short, there are no panaceas in view. Development and redevelopment will doubtless continue to be a strongly protected incident
of land ownership. This incident is certainly a principal basis of expectations within our system of private ownership rights, and its
destruction would not be tolerated. The question then becomes whether this incident of ownership-this constitutionally protected expectation-can be modified so as to preserve its major operative values and
yet also to render it tractable to the protection of increasingly urgent
social values. A modem idea and a relatively elderly body of legal
precedent may combine to achieve a breakthrough.
II.

SEVERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

The modern idea is that the right to develop land may be considered a quantifiable and transferable incident of land ownership.
It has been implicit in zoning since the 1920's that the right may be
quantifiable. For instance, under various zoning categories a ten-acre
tract may have the following quantifiable development potential: oneacre minimum lot size, single-family residential use-ten dwellings;
one-fourth acre minimum lot size, single-family residential use-forty
dwellings; ten unit per acre multiple-family residential use-one
hundred living units.
The next step in the modern notion is that quantified development rights may be separated from rigid and direct affixation to landthat is, that development rights may be severed. Severance in the
Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas 110 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (1961). See
also Krasnowiecki & Strong, Compensable Regulation for Open Space, 24 J. AM. INST.
PLANNERS

87 (1963).

Compensated regulation does, of course, raise extremely troublesome issues, some
of which presently, and perhaps fortunately, lie dormant under the conventional
taking analysis. Owners would doubtless seek compensation for diminution in land
values previously created by direct public investment, or by general increases in the
value of land derived from expansions of population and technology, for which the
individual landowner assertibly deserves little credit. The provision for compensation
might result in a great increase in the number of judicial determinations that a taking
had occurred and that compensation was due. If development is imminent, it may be
no more expensive to acquire clear title than to compensate for extremely rigorous
regulation. Those experienced in eminent domain litigation may blanch at the prospects
of myriad compensation determinations in the hands of juries. Administrative determination of awards would perhaps be preferable. The potential amounts of compensation payable would doubtless be massive, but unliquidated, posing major funding
problems. The transaction costs of determining myriad compensation awards might
prove intolerable.

48

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.2:35

negative sense of relinquishment of certain types of development
rights has resulted consistently from zoning and from private restrictive covenants. When land is zoned for single-family residential use
or is subject to covenants for the same purpose, the development right
for "lower" uses, such as multiple-family, commercial and industrial
uses, is severed from the land. Such negative relinquished rights are
occasionally made the subject of eminent domain.39 Since negative rights
are severed, however, no party acquires the affirmative ability to make
use of these rights. They are simply shorn from the land, extinguished
in legal effect. It is assertible, of course, that under zoning much
of the value of these extinguished rights is transferred, gratis, to those
relatively few owners whose land is zoned for high-density residential,
commercial and industrial uses.40
The modern idea further contemplates that affirmative rights,
rather than negative rights, may be made transferable. An affirmative right of development, specific in quantity and quality, may be
granted to a tract of land as is done in zoning, but in contrast to zoning,
the development right may be sold or transferred by the landowner
for use elsewhere, for example, on another tract of land. 41
To bring this modern notion into better focus, it is helpful to outline the manner in which development rights and the market place
for them might be created. A major planning effort would 'come first.
A large region, perhaps a state planning region, would be subjected
to various analytic and planning techniques. Analysis42 of natural
components would disclose areas that should be developed lightly or
not at all, for reasons such as the presence of hazards (e.g., flood
channels and plains, geologically unstable areas) and the performance
of important natural functions (e.g., carrying floodwaters, groundwater recharge). More conventional planning analysis would reveal
other factors that influence development, such as the predictable extension of sewer and water services, the impact of transportation
corridors that divide an area and make subparts of it accessible, and
the growth trends of existing cities and towns into satellite regions.
All these characteristics could then be superimposed by the over39. See, e.g., Kamrowski v. State, 142 N.W.2d 793 (Wis. 1966) (upholding the
eminent domain acquisition of development rights, for scenic easement purposes).
40. See discussion p. 40 supra.
41. For discussions of the operation of this concept in limited circumstances, see
Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Land.
marks, 85 HARv. L. REv. 574 (1972); Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York
City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972).
42. Techniques for much of the physical inventory and analysis of the region are
fully set forth in 1. McHARG, supra note 35, at 31-41, 55-195.
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lay mapping technique.4 3 With this technique, many clear, glassine
maps of the study area are prepared on the same scale. Each factor
(e.g., groundwater recharge areas, geologic hazard areas, prime agricultural lands, erosive soils) is then depicted on an individual map by
coloring the areas of the map where the factor is present. The intensity
of color indicates the degree to which the factor exists in various areas.
Thus, if a map depicted geologic hazard areas in red, very heavy red
coloring would indicate areas of maximum risk; lighter red would
indicate moderate risk; very pale red, slight risk; and glassine with
no coloration would indicate absence of risk. Each factor would be
indicated by its own color and depicted on its own map-for example,
a map with red coloring for geologic risk, a map with brown coloring
for erosive soils, a map with blue coloring for groundwater recharge
areas, etc. Each glassine map, then, would visually depict a factor
as it occurred in varying intensity over the study area. In addition,
common coding of the shade of coloration on all maps would be
done so that the color shading from dark to light to clear would uniformly indicate a progression from "highly unfavorable for development," to "highly favorable for development," respectively. Using
the same technique, additional sets of maps could be prepared to
indicate various planning rconsiderations such as impact of transportation corridors, existing growth trends and service areas and their
extensions over time. The various glassine transparencies, thus color
coded, would then be overlaid, one on top of another, and illuminated
from underneath. Many maps graphically depicting many characteristics may thus be viewed and analyzed simultaneously. The result is
a visual representation of the study area with numerous factors simultaneously revealed as they all, in combination, indicate suitability or
unsuitability for development throughout the study area.
Rather than creating a hopeless visual hodgepodge of coloration,
as might be expected, the color-coded overlay technique typically discloses that anti-development factors tend to coalesce in certain areas.
The remainder of the region is thus depicted as suitable for development ranging from light to heavy intensity. Examination of such an
overlay map would usually show the study region subdivided into
major areas within which the bulk of development should take
place. Each of these areas would typically be separated, either partially
or wholly, from similar neighboring areas by strips and tracts of
land on which little or no development should occur. Visually, the
developable areas would appear as large islands, lightly shaded or
unshaded, separated by strips and patches of darkly-colored areas
43.

See id. at 103-15 for a detailed exposition of the technique.
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that would not be amenable to heavy development. Each major development area, or development island as it would appear on the
map, would then be considered a "planning district"-a discrete unit
of land typically embracing at least several square miles within which
a comprehensive plan for development would be created.
Each development island or planning district would include its
ratable share of the surrounding, darkly-colored, nondevelopable land.
The principal functions of this nondevelopable land would include
preservation of natural functions, prevention of naturally hazardous
development, and provision of buffer zones and spatial separation between the planning districts. The purpose of allocating to each
planning district its ratable share of nondevelopable lands will be discussed shortly.
Consider one such imaginary planning district and assume that
it contains several square miles composed largely of farms and a few
scattered residential properties and small commercial establishments.
Within the district, various areas would be amenable to heavy, moderate and light development based on the inventory of natural characteristics and additional planning criteria. Land at the periphery of the
district and some additional land within would be amenable to little
or no development, based on the analytic processes outlined above.
Orderly expansion of services and other factors would control the
timing and placement of development within the district. Types
of development such as residential, commercial and industrial would
be arrayed over the district using either conventional zoning or devices analogous to floating zones or planned unit developments. Ultimate district development densities of various types would be worked
out. The result would be that each district, within its perimeter of
undeveloped land, would be planned in a manner comparable to the
planning that currently takes place over an entire zoning jurisdiction.
Once planning had been done satisfactorily, the plan would be
translated into development rights. To accomplish this, principal
reliance would be placed on the ultimate development densities for
which the district was scheduled, as expressed in quantitative terms.
For simplicity's sake, assume the district is planned for 12,000
people. Using an acceptable reduction figure to compute average
household size, this might mean that a total of 3,800 individual
dwelling units would be allowed. Assuming that each residential
development right authorized its holder to construct one dwelling
unit, the next step would be to allocate development rights among
the individual landowners within the district. Assume that A, B and C
each owns 100 acres of land. Further assume that it has been deter-
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mined by the overlay-map analytilc processes mentioned above that
A's land should support no more than 25 residential units, B's should
support 100 and C's is suitable for higher density use with 175 units.
Under the present systems of planning and zoning, C's land would be
relatively valuable, B's land moderately valuable, and A could litigate
the regulation as unconstitutionally onerous or could simply absorb
the major value diminution imposed upon his property.
If development rights were used, however, this highly differential
impact on land value could be largely avoided. Since development
rights are by our definition severable and transferable, they may be
allocated among various tracts without regard to the development
densities that are actually permitted on those tracts by zoning. To return to the hypothetical, assume that the district contains 3,800 acres
and that the determination has been made to spread the 3,800 available residential unit development rights evenly over the district. A, B
and C would then each receive 100 residential unit development
rights since each owns a 100-acre tract. Because of existing density
controls, A could use only 25 of the residential unit development rights
allocated to him, but he would have 75 rights left to sell or to hold as
he chose. B could use all of his 100 rights since they correspond to his
permitted density. He could, if he wished, sell some or all of them, but
he would later have to purchase more rights if he wished to develop to
his permitted 100-unit density. C could make full use of his 100 rights
and in fact would have to purchase 75 more if he were to develop his
land to full permissible density. He might buy A's 75 surplus rights,
which would bring him up to the full density potential of 175 units.
If this occurred, A could still develop to his land's full permissible
density with his remaining 25 rights.
It is likely that the planning district would also ,comprise the
sole marketplace for the development rights of owners within it. Importation or exportation of rights, unless quite limited, would be inconsistent with the premise that the number of rights allocated within
a district should coincide with the densities permitted in that district,
although there might be some flexibility permitted in the application
of this principle. Within the district, owners and their development
rights would be thrown together into a common marketplace-a common pool as it were-for the purchase and sale of development rights.
This is a much more explicit, institutional version of what takes
44
place when zoning is instituted, but the consequences are quite
different. Despite being accorded an equal allocation of rights on a
per-acre basis in the simplified example above, some owners would
44.

See cases cited notes 13. 21-33 supra.
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'be permitted to develop little, or perhaps not at all if they are located
in a flood plain or in an inter-district buffer zone. These same results
are sought frequently through zoning, but are upheld only infrequently and are often overturned by the courts as unconstitutional diminutions of the value of property. 45 Under the development rights system,
however, owners whose ability to develop is restricted pursuant to
natural resources and planning decisions could nonetheless receive
substantial remuneration by selling their unusable rights to others who
need them. The sale of rights would not compromise the integrity of
the district plan and it should obviate the taking question.
The use of development rights should also prove directly responsive to the problems of the value shifts and value inequities."6 It
seems highly likely that the destruction, rcreation, transfer and bestowal
of entitlements that occur within the zoning pool could be largely
eliminated by development rights-certainly the major peaks and
valleys would be considerably leveled. 47 Development rights could
also allay much of the value diminution caused by substantial deferral
of development entitlement and by the newly emerging thrust to protect public rights in natural resources.48 These uses of development
rights will be developed in more detail.49
In addition to the present experiments with the limited-purpose
use of development rights mentioned earlier, such as for scenic easements, 50 the broad-purpose use of development rights set forth above
has been introduced for consideration in at least one state legislature,5 1
and is being seriously discussed elsewhere. 52 It finds theoretical support
in existing strands of legal doctrine, some of which predate the formation of this nation. Major redefinitions of private property rights
have been imposed by legislatures and approved by courts when dictated by strong public need and the peculiar realities of resource use.
Common threads of precedent and fact underlie public purposes as
45. See cases cited notes 8, 15 supra.
46. See discussion and cases cited p. 41 supra.
47. For a discussion of development rights for commercial and industrial uses,
see p. 102 infra.
48. See pp. 43-44 supra.
49. See p. 102 infra.
50. See note 39 supra.
51. MD. S. 255 (1972).
52. During the past year the author has discussed this concept with several
Colorado legislators and legislative draftsmen, with an eye toward the possibility of
new state legislation. Also, in the author's file, under letter of transmittal dated April
2, 1973, from Frank S. Bangs, Editor, LAND USE CoNTROLS QUARTERLY, American Society
of Planning Officials (ASPO), Chicago, are various critiques of and amplifications on
the consequences of the proposed Maryland bill prepared by the ASPO staff and
others.
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seemingly disparate as the erection of milldams, the formation of
drainage and irrigation ditches, and the pooling and unitization of oil
and gas reservoirs. To effectuate these public purposes, coordinated involvement of numerous tracts of privately owned land was necessary.
Coordinated involvement in a common purpose has consistently been
held to justify very substantial modification of the rights of the affected
private landowners. A brief survey of these major bodies of legal precedent will help determine whether a doctrinal base exists for the
creation of planning districts within which the development potential
of individual tracts may be converted into transferable development
rights.
III. LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

A. Early Transportation Systems

The colonies and their successor states early made consistent practice of chartering private corporations to plan, construct and maintain
toll roads or turnpikes as supplements to the few roads that could be
53
maintained by using limited public funds. It was apparent that if
the rcorporations did not have power to lay routes as seemed best,
they could be forced to detour interminably around the lands of objecting owners or be forced to pay exorbitant prices for rights-of-way.
Thus, they were customarily empowered to acquire rights-of-way compulsorily, upon impartial determination and payment of compensa54
tion to the affected private landowner. State regulation required
53. See, e.g., Stanwood v. Pierce, 7 Mass. 458 (1811); Concord R.R. v. Greely, 17
N.H. 47, 62 (1845); Proprietors of the Third Turnpike Road v. Champney, 2 N.H. 199
(1820); State v. Town of Hampton, 2 N.H. 22, 24 (1819); Brief for Defendant at 60,
Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45 (N.Y. Ch. 1831) (mentioning fifteen
hundred turnpike, bridge and canal corporations incorporated in New York state at
that time and numerous others in other states). Normally the turnpike corporations
were chartered to lay roads from one town or site to another. See, e.g., Stanwood v.
Pierce, supra, concerning whether a legislatively designated tollroad terminus had
properly been reached.
54. See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 428 (1823); Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73-74 (N.Y. Ch. 1831). Damages were typically determined
to
by a jury or assessed by court-appointed commissioners if the parties were unable
agree. Id. See also Barre Turnpike Corp. v. Appleton, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 430 (1824), for
review of the procedural regularity of damage assessment proceedings.
It should be noted at this point that all of the legal structures that will be explored
(transportation systems, milldams, drainage and irrigation systems, and oil and gas
regulation) contain major procedural due process dimensions relating to such matters
as the assessment of damages for land taken in the case of the transportation systems
and milldams, assessment of betterment charges in the case of drainage and irrigation
districts, and computation of entitlement to shares of production with respect to oil and
gas regulations. These problems will not be considered in detail, but the reader should
bear in mind that beneath the substantive doctrines covered, there have constantly
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the turnpike corporations to maintain the roads and controlled the
fee to be charged to the public for toll road use. The public had the
incontrovertible right to use the roads upon the payment of requisite
fees. s5 Direct right of use by the public (hereinafter referred to as
"user") was thus assured. The delegation of eminent
domain power to
private corporations was not litigated in early times. A mixture of
public necessity, public use and ratification by longstanding custom
apparently rendered the practice acceptable in contemporary eyes.
The scheme of the early enabling statutes for turnpike corporations was later duplicated by many state legislatures in authorizing the
construction of canals in the late 1700's and of railroads beginning in
the 1820's.96 In both applications, private corporations were chartered
lurked procedural due process tensions that have been troublesome for the administrators
of these systems, and that have provoked abundant litigation.
55. One court has described the public right as follows:
A turnpike is a public road or highway, in the popular and ordinary sense
of the words, and in that sense the Legislature are to be presumed to have employed them. Turnpike roads are, in point of fact, the most public roads or
highways that are known to exist, and in point of law, they are made entirely for
public use, and the community have a deep interest in their construction and
preservation. They are under legislative regulations, and the gates are subject to
be thrown open, and the Company indicted and fined, if the road is not made
and kept easy and safe for the public use.
Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 735, 742 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1823). See also Newburyport
Turnpike Corp. v. Eastern R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 326, 327 (1840); Medford Turnpike Corp. v. Torrey, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 538 (1824); Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks and
Canals, 7 Mass. 169, 179 (1810) (argument for defendants containing statement of liabilities of turnpike corporations for failure to maintain roads in good repair); Concord
R.R. v. Greely, 17 N.H. 47, 62 (1845); Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J.Eq. 694,
728 (1832); Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 75 (N.Y. Ch. 1831).
56. In Proprietors of Sudbury Meadows v. Proprietors of Middlesex Canal, 40
Mass. (23 Pick.) 36, 49 (1839), the court alludes to the canal company's 1793 charter
as a very early one of the sort. See the history of Potomac [Canal] Company, chartered
in 1784 and later to become the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, as set forth in
Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 17 Md. 1, 72-73 (1832). The brief
in one early case states that the practice of chartering railroad corporations was begun
by the states in 1824. Brief for Defendant at 63, Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige
Ch. 45 (N.Y. Ch. 1831).
Canals were first used as a circumferential system to connect the waterways north
and west of Boston, and to bypass lower falls on the coastal rivers. Later, much more
ambitious projects were launched to connect the Hudson River with Lake Erie and Lake
Champlain, and to connect the Potomac River with the Ohio Valley. See cases supra
and note 58 infra. Especially in these latter instances, public enthusiasm was great, as
evidenced by this ebullient language used by Chancellor Kent in giving an expansive
reading to the statutory powers of the New York Canal Commissioners:
If there was ever a case in the ordinary pacific operations of government in which
all petty private interests should be made subservient to the interest of an entire
people, this is one. The canals were undertaken "in full confidence that the
Congress of the United States, and the States equally interested with this State
in the commencement, prosecution, and completion of these important works,
would contribute their full proportion of the expense." We have not as yet
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to lay rights-of-way, to construct and maintain facilities to transport appropriate vessels in the case of canals and, in the case of railroads, to
transport the public and its goods, upon payment of regulated fees. 57
The power of eminent domain in the canal corporations was for
the most part only a collateral issue in the very early cases, 58 and the
analogy to turnpike corporations seems to have been sufficiently convincing that the judiciary had little pause in approving this power in
the canal corporations. 9 Railroads presented a somewhat more difficult case, however,60 since public user was less ,clear"l and occurred
realized the fruits of that confidence, and we are left to bear singly the whole
expense, as well as to enjoy all the honor and glory of this stupendous undertaking.
Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 342-43 (N.Y. Ch. 1823).
57. As to canals, see Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co. v. Key, 3 D.C. 599, 605 (1829);
Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks and Canals, 7 Mass. 169 (1810); Lebanon v. Olcott,
I N.H. 339 (1818). It does not appear that the absolute right to use railroads upon
payment of requisite charges was quite as well assured initially as it was in the case
of turnpikes and canals. But see Brief for Plaintiff at 48-49, Brief for Defendant at
61-62, Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45 (N.Y. Ch. 1831). The problem,
if there was one, did not persist.
58. In one early Massachusetts case the eminent domain powers of a canal corporation were reviewed very briefly and approved on the analogy to the milldams. See
Stevens v. Proprietors of Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass. 466, 468 (1815). In two other
major, early cases, however, the conflicts were between canal corporations and other
utilities, and the courts thus did not focus squarely on the private eminent domain
powers of the canal corporations. Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 17
Md. 1, 72-73 (1832); Proprietors of Sudbury Meadows v. Proprietors of Middlesex Canal,
40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 36, 49 (1839). See also Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J.
Eq. 694, 728 (1832), in which the propriety of a milldam corporation's power to condemn a sluiceway was subsumed in the larger question of its powers to erect a milldam
to which the sluiceway was appurtenant. Early, influential New York cases construed the
eminent domain powers of the state Canal Commissioners under their enabling statutes,
and thus did not consider private corporate use of eminent domain. See Wheelock v.
Young, 4 Wend. 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 342-43
(N.Y. Ch. 1823); Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 735, 742 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1823). But see
Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co. v. Key, 3 D.C. 599, 605 (1829), in which the court sustained
corporate use of eminent domain against a protesting owner. The condemnation proceedings were overturned due to procedural irregularities. Id. at 610-11. See also note
54 supra. The condemnee was one Francis Scott Key, appearing pro se, whose "land
of the free" sentiments may have been sorely tested by this litigation.
59. See cases cited note 58 supra.
60. Without a brief excursion into the context of the times, it is perhaps a bit
difficult to fathom the obstacles of fact, doctrine and policy presented in the early
1830's when the courts were asked to extend to the infant railroad companies the
doctrinal treatment previously accorded the power of eminent domain held by turnpike and canal corporations. In this era, railroads were literally roads making use of
rails, and locomotives were extremely crude, weak and unreliable. See the terms of an
early railroad grant mentioned in Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 20-21
(N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837), which authorized the railroad to use any combination of power,
including animals and steam or other mechanical power. Another early railroad was
expected to scale the Allegheny Mountains by using one hundred stationary steam
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only in the railroads' carriages and in accordance with their schedules
of operations. This contrasted with the public's ability, on turnpikes
and canals, to use their own conveyances at their own convenience and
for their own purposes of profit or pleasure.6 2 If this diluted public
user would support eminent domain powers in the railroad corporations, why not also in theater, hotel and a host of other corporations?

The power of eminent domain in the railroad rcorporations was nonetheless upheld. The analogy to turnpikes could be stretched this far.
The direct public user was deemed sufficiently certain, the necessity
of a linear right-of-way was apparent and the delegation of this transportation function from the state to private corporations was not
deemed impermissible.6 3
By the mid-1830's the use of eminent domain by private transportation corporations had received initial approval in influential
jurisdictions. The power was limited in its exercise to acquisition of
rights-of-way and necessary appurtenant lands. Direct public user
helped justify the judicial approval, but a broader concept also began
to emerge. The canals and especially the railroads were major technological breakthroughs promising immense multiplier effects in openengines. See Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 17 Md. 1, 34 (1832).
Further, most early railroad charters were for short lines connecting specified towns
or waterways. See, e.g., routes detailed in Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend.
9 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837); and the Massachusetts process of awarding charters for the
completion of portions of the routes that would eventually link Boston with Providence,
!R.I. and with the Hudson River, as described in Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston &
Worcester R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 360, 363-65 (1839). The railroads, as considered by the
courts in the earliest cases, were at best an alternative to and modest improvement
over tollroads and canals. See generally Chesapeake & 0. Canal Co. v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 17 Md. 1, 72-73 (1832). There is no indication in the lengthy briefs and opinions
in that case whether the railroad or the canals were thought in 1832 to have the
better chance of scaling the mountains and connecting the Potamac and Ohio basins.
61. Brief for Plaintiff at 48-49, Brief for Defendant at 61-62, Bekman v. Saratoga
& S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45 (N.Y. Ch. 1831).
62. See Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 74 (N.Y. Ch. 1831); Bloodgood
v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 15-16 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837). To make this distinction
more intelligible to a modern reader, it is the 19th century public-user equivalent to
the current automobile driver's resistance when told that he should utilize mass transit
and leave the car at home.
63. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Van Ness, 4 D.C. (4 Cranch.) 595 (1835); Concord R.R. v.
Greely, 17 N.H. 47 (1845); Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 60 (N.Y. Ch.
1831); Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 20-21 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837) (scrutinizing closely and construing the regularity of the condemnation procedure involved).
In the first railroad case considered in Massachusetts, the propriety of eminent domain
in a railroad corporation was not raised by the condemnee. See Carpenter v. County
Comm'rs, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 258 (1838). The next two cases considered involved the
powers of railroad corporations vis-a-vis those of a turnpike, see Newburyport Turnpike
Corp. v. Eastern R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 326 (1839), and of a large dam proprietor,
see Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & W.R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 360, 363-65 (1839).
The propriety of the railroads' eminent domain powers was tacitly approved.
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ing new territory and allowing the massive rapid transport of goods,
people, mails and troops in time of war. 64 None of this was lost on the
courts, and the "public use" served by canals and railroads became
a mixture of two doctrines. Public user was present, but second and
strongly ascendant was the interpretation of "public use" as general
public utility and benefit, perhaps tantamount to a felt necessity given
the tremendous impetus of the times toward commercial, industrial
and territorial expansion.65
64. In witness whereof, the following is set forth at length for fanciers of florid
panygeric, 19th century variety:
Railroads are not only of great public use in the ordinary business transactions
of the citizen, but they may be more advantageously used than turnpike roads
for national purposes; . . . for the transportation of mails, and the rapid dissemination of intelligence, which is the life of liberty, and more than any other
mode of conveyance, they tend to annihilate distance, bringing in effect places far
distant near to each other: tending in their magic influence to the extension of
personal acquaintance, the enlargement of business relations, and cementing more
firmly the bond of fellowship and union between the inhabitants of the States.
Next to the moral lever power of the press, should be ranked the beneficial
influence of railroads in their effects upon the vast and increasing business relations of the nation, and the promoting, sustaining and perpetuating the happiness, prosperity and liberty of the people.
Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R.. 18 Wend. 9, 48 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837).
65. In New York, the "public use as public utility" doctrine received its dearest
early formulation as it concerned railroads. Public use may mean that property is
possessed and used directly by the government, as was the case with the major New
York canals but not with the railroads. See notes 56-58 supra. The New York courts
then were obliged to formulate a manageable public-use doctrine that would legitimate the
power of eminent domain in the railroads against the immediate background of cases
involving that power in the state-owned canal system.
The rationale adopted was a mixture of deference to legislative judgment and
acceptance of at least a moderate amount of legislatively-decreed public utility as
sufficient:
[I]f the Legislature should attempt thus to transfer the property of one individual to another, where there could be no pretense of benefit to the public
by such exchange, it would probably be a violation of the contract by which
the land was granted by the government to the individual, or to those under
whom he claimed title, and repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States. But if the public interest can be in any way promoted by the taking
of private property, it must rest in the wisdom of the Legislature to determine
whether the benefit to the public will be of sufficient importance to render it
expedient for them to exercise the right of eminent domain, and to authorize an
interference with the private rights of individuals for that purpose.
Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. Ch. 1831). To justify the exercise
of the right of eminent domain, there must be a necessity, or at least an evident utility
on the part of the public. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 20-21 (N.Y. Ct.
Err. 1837).
Perhaps the most thorough and useful analysis of public use as public purpose
contained in 19th century case law may be found in Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534
(1883). After discussing a first class of cases in which the government acquires land
by eminent domain, Judge Green continued:
The second class of cases to which I have alluded is where the property is
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Summary of the Relation of Legal Doctrine to Development Rights.This brief survey of the private use of eminent domain by the early
transportation corporations simply serves to trace to their beginnings
the doctrines that will be developed subsequently. It is not suggested
that eminent domain be used for either the creation or the acquisition
of development rights. The concern of this article is with the various
theories justifying the assemblage of rights in individually owned
tracts, as was done to create transportation rights-of-way. This power
of assemblage by eminent domain, finally questionable in the hands
of the infant railroad corporations, was justified by a substantial expansion of precedent-that of public utility to bolster the sagging
reality of public user. The public utility contemplated was the expected multiplier effect on state and national development if transportation technology, in the hands of its corporate promoters, were given
the "forward march" with eminent domain to clear the trail. Of
course the evolution of the substantive content of the "public utility"
concept will be closely examined in the following sections, for this
concept has changed radically over time.
B. The Milldam Acts
Of antiquity equal to that of the turnpikes was the colonial pracin the direct use and occupation of a private person or of a private corporation,
and the general public have only an indirect and qualified use of the property
condemned, or perhaps no use probably of any kind of the property condemned,
but simply derives from its use by the owner for his private purposes some indirect advantage, as by the promotion of the general prosperity of the community.
I think we can show from the decisions, that a person or corporation
claiming to belong to this second class, and to have legislative authority to condemn lands, must first show, that he or they are possessed of each and all of these
three qualifications. First, the general public must have a definite and fixed use
of the property to be condemned, a use independent of the will of the private
person or private corporation in whom the title of the property when condemned
will be vested; a public use which cannot be defeated by such private owner,
but which public use continues to be guarded and controlled by the general public
through laws passed by the Legislature; second, this public use must be clearly
a needful one for the public, one which cannot be given up without obvious
general loss and inconvenience; third, it must be impossible, or very difficult at
least, to secure the same public uses and purposes in any other way than by
authorizing the condemnation of private property.
If any one of these essentials are wanting, the courts will declare the act of the
Legislature authorizing such condemnation of private property to be unconstitutional, because it would amount to taking private property for private and not for
public uses.
Id. at 555-56. In this case the court held unconstitutional a statute authorizing the use
of eminent domain to acquire private rights-of-way. See Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry.,
208 U.S. 598 (1908), as an example of judicial review of an alleged use of railroad
eminent domain for a private purpose. i.e., to acquire a spur right-of-way to serve
one factory.
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tice by which a private owner on a stream could erect a dam to harness
the water power and thus create special rights in himself.8 6 Almost inevitably, the lands of upper streamcourse owners were flooded by the
resulting pond. Had their right to exclusive possession of their properties been inviolable, they could have sued to have the dam torn
down and their properties freed of the pond's encroachment.6 7 As in
the case of the transportation systems, a dissident private owner would
thus have had obstructionist or "holdup" rights against a beneficial resource use. From at least the early 1700's, however, in many states the
upstream owners were confined by statute to actions solely for damages
resulting from the flooding, thereby leaving dam, pond and energy
68
production intact.

Most early usage of this sort was to power grist mills. Millers
operated under state regulation obliging them to grind the grain of
all comers, in turn, as fine as could be, with exaction of a statutory
share of the flour produced as the fee. 69 In this sense, public user of the
66. See, e.g., practices and statutes cited in Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U.S.
140, 151 (1906); Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 16-20 (1885); Talbot v. Hudson, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 417, 426 (1860); Hatch v. Dwight, 17 Mass. 289 (1821) (involving an "ancient" milldam); Brief for Petitioner at 447-51, Great Falls Mfg. Co. v.
Fernald, 47 N.H. 444 (1867); Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534, 544-46 (1883) (stating
that the practice in Virginia antedates 1700).
67. See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 16-20 (1885); Stowell v. Flagg,
11 Mass. 364 (1814), in which the effect of the Massachusetts act on common
law remedies was first decided; Bates v. Weymouth Iron Co., 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 548
(1851); Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317 (1855); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 47 N.H.
426 (1867). In addition to the problem of physical invasion, it is certain that the millponds were a nuisance in the neighborhood on frequent occasions. See Ryerson v.
Brown, 35 Mich. Rpts. 333, 341 (1877). Despite the statutes, the flowage right had some
substantive limitations. The flooded upstream owner could apparently construct dikes
on his firm land to turn back the waters of the pond. See Storm v. Manchaug Co., 95
Mass. (13 Allen) 10, 13-14 (1866). The Massachusetts act was held not to authorize
damming on one stream if the water impounded was to be diverted to create power
on another stream. Bates v. Weymouth Iron Co., 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 548 (1851).
68. Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. 140, 151 (1906); Head v. Amoskeag Mfg.
Co., 113 U.S. 9, 16-20 (1885); Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317 (1855); Scudder v. Trenton
Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J.Eq. 694, 728 (1832). This is not to say, of course, that there was
not much litigation over the application of the acts to particular factual situations. See
e.g., Storm v. Manchuag Co., 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 10, 13 (1866); Bates v. Weymouth
Iron Co., 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 548 (1851). Other lawsuits challenged the validity of damage assessment proceedings. See, e.g., Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Head, 59 N.H. 332 (1879),
aff'd, 113 U.S. 9 (1885); Ash v. Cummings, 50 N.H. 591 (1872) (common law tort
action not barred until damage proceedings conducted and award paid). Failure to provide for damages caused by flooding of lands by a private corporation chartered by the
state was the ground for invalidation in the celebrated case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
69. See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885); Harding v. Goodlett, 11
Tenn. 40, 45, 53 (1832); Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534, 546-47 (1883), stating: "[O]wners
of water grist-mills were by these acts made as it were public servants." Lest we feel
undue sympathy for these flour-encrusted drudges, one miller per mill was exempted
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mill was guaranteed as it was of the turnpikes. Public user combined
with the virtually indispensible public utility of grist mills to make
secure this early usage of the mill acts. Here again was the grant of
the power of eminent domain to a private individual to further a resource use, with regulated participation guaranteed to the public and
with compensation paid for unavoidable damages to the property of
other owners.
In the earliest judicial consideration of the milldam acts, shortly
after 1800, the courts relied heavily on the longstanding use and ratification of the acts by custom, admitting that, were the practice novel,
it might be a dubious one.7 0 Indeed, courts in a few states later iconfined the milldam prerogative to grist mills alone, stating that these
were recognized and regulated as public utilities with public user
guaranteed and that other types of mills without guaranteed public
user failed to satisfy the public user requirement necessary to entitle
them to powers of eminent domain. 7' In some New England states,
from military watches and warnings in early Massachusetts. Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg.
Co., 201 U.S. 140, 151-52 (1906). In Tennessee, mill keepers were in early times exempted
from militia, jury duty and the road maintenance work required of able-bodied
males. Harding v. Goodlett, 11 Tenn. 40, 52 (1832).
70. The Massachusetts court stated:
I cannot help thinking that this statute was incautiously copied from the
ancient colonial and provincial acts, which were passed when the use of mills,
from the scarcity of them, bore a much greater value, compared to the land
used for the purposes of agriculture, than at present. But with this we have
nothing to do. As the law is, so we must declare it.
Stowell v. Flagg, 11 Mass. 364, 368 (1814).
Whether, if this were an original question, this legislation would be considered
as trenching too closely upon the great principle, which gives security to private
rights, it seems now too late to inquire, such legislation having been in full
operation in this state a century and a half.
Murdock v. Stickney, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 113, 117 (1851). See also Jordan v. Woodward,
40 Me. 317, 323 (1855), expressing similar reflections. In New Hampshire, the constitutionality of the milldam acts was not squarely raised and clearly decided until Ash
v. Cummings, 50 N.H. 591 (1872), in which a similar approach was taken.
71. Initially, dictum appeared in cases indicating that the use of these acts in
certain cases might pose grave state constitutional questions. See Hay v. Cohoes Co.,
2 N.Y. 159 (1849); Harding v. Goodlett, 11 Tenn. 40, 53-54 (1832). See also Sadler v.
Langham, 34 Ala. 311 (1859). Thereafter invalidation on state constitutional grounds
first occurred in three nearly simultaneous cases: Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500
(1871); Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. Rpts. 333 (1877); Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648 (1871).
In each of these cases, the court stressed that the statutes would have authorized the
use of eminent domain for general milldam purposes, and not solely for grist mills.
Ryerson v. Brown contains a most useful discussion on the realities of resource use
that might persuade the judiciary to uphold an act in one era, while invalidating it
in another:
An examination of the adjudged cases will show that the courts, in looking
about for the public use that was to be accommodated by the [milldam] statute,
have sometimes attached considerable importance to the fact that the general
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improvement of mill-sites, as property possessing great value if improved, and
often nearly worthless if not improved, would largely conduce to the prosperity
of the state. This is especially true of the decisions in those states where water
power is most abundant, and where, partly because of a somewhat sterile soil,
manufactures have attracted a larger proportion than in other states, of the
capital, skill and labor of the community. In this state it is doubtful if such
legislation would add at all to the aggregate of property. Numerous fine millsites in the populous counties of the state still remain unimproved, not because
of any difficulty in obtaining the necessary permission to flow, but because the
power is not in demand.
. . . If the act were limited in its scope to manufactures which are of local
necessity, as grist-mills are in a new country not yet penetrated by railroads, the
question would be somewhat different from what it is now. But even in such case
it would be essential that the statute should require the use to be public in
fact; in other words, that it should contain provisions entitling the public to
accommodations. A flouring mill in this state may grind exclusively the wheat
of Wisconsin, and sell the product exclusively in Europe; and it is manifest
that in such a case the proprietor can have no valid claim to the interposition
of the law to compel his neighbor to sell a business site to him, any more
than could the manufacturer of shoes or the retailer of groceries.
If, however, the use to which the property is to be devoted were one which
would justify an exercise of the power, it would still be imperative that a
necessity should exist for its exercise. All the authorities require that there should
be a necessity for the appropriation in order to supply some public want, or
to advance some public policy; the object to be accomplished must be one
which otherwise is impracticable.
The opinion then considered an earlier milldam act, upon which the statute under
consideration was patterned. Ryerson v. Brown, supra at 337-39. Judge Campbell, concurring, stressed the changes in the state's economy:
The territory was then in a state of almost complete isolation. Until the Erie
canal was completed the expense of bringing steam machinery so great a distance
would have been ruinous, and in the condition of the local roads it would have
been impracticable. Emigrants [sic] were coming in rapidly and mills were
necessary for their existence. Towns could not be maintained or even built
without them. Water mills were the only ones of any utility in such communities,
and their necessity was urgent. They were undoubtedly as indispensable as
roads, and in fact very commonly preceded them. The judgment of the legislature was in complete accordance with the facts.
The declaration of necessity in 1824 was no more significant than the finding
that no further necessity existed in 1828, and this was no doubt owing to the
introduction of steam. Any stream which is capable of furnishing water power
is still more capable of furnishing water for running steam machinery; and any
one who has the right to use running water at his steam mill is independent
of riparian owners above him.
Id. at 345-46 (Campbell, J., concurring).
These passages illustrate that, although the physical reality of resource use remained
constant (a dammer necessarily flooded an upstream riparian owner), the social need
for the resource use shifted. Thus the earlier grist milldam statute effective between
1824 and 1828 would apparently have been valid in that era, but in 1877, the court
in the instant case invalidated a general milldam statute. Also note that the progress
of technology effected a complete reversal in doctrine-the perfection of steam power
eliminated the dependency on water power for milling. We asserted earlier that, in a
comparable manner, the interaction of technology, population expansion and affliuence
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however, courts in early cases uncritically reviewed use of the milldam
acts to foster mills for a wide range of industrial use, many of them
purely private to the mill proprietors and lacking the element of

public user that grist mills had.72 In these states, public user receded
to nearly an irrelevance, and the multiplier effect of general-purpose
mill energy on the industrial and employment base of the state was
elevated to the level of adequate justification for ,conferring the power
73
of eminent domain on private individuals and corporations.
have so precipitated abilities to alter and develop land that a fundamental shift in
the perception of land resources and their preservation is necessary. See p. 43 supra.
Compare Township of Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U.S. 310 (1876), with Osborne v. County
of Adams, 106 U.S. 181 (1882), involving the propriety of issuing internal improvement
bonds under state statutes in order to fund steam-powered grist mills.
72. Thus, Hatch v. Dwight, 17 Mass. 289 (1821), involved a milldam said to be
ancient, from which the water power was used to power a corn and hide mill. The
court took no exception to the hide mill use. Boston & Roxbury Mill Dam Corp. v.
Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467 (1832), involved a charter for a major dam across
one of the necks of Boston harbor, which was to carry a roadway on top and to tap
tidal ebb and flow, thereby generating sufficient diurnal energy to support a mill with
energy equivalent to 20 pairs of millstones. In holding that the corporation validly
held eminent domain powers to remove encroachments in the tidal basin, the court
failed to make any distinction between grist mills and the general purpose energy
source at hand and instead gave its approval to the public utility of the project in
the following terms:
Here was a creation of an immense perpetual mill power, as well as a safe
and commodious avenue, in and over the waste waters of the ocean and adjoining
to a great city.
We should be at a loss to imagine any undertaking of an individual or association of persons with a view to private emolument, in which the public had
a more certain and direct interest and benefit.
Id. at 476. See also Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317 (1855); Brief for Petitioners at
447-51, Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444 (1867).
73. See Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534 (1883); note 65 supra; cases cited note 72
supra. The perspective from the New Hampshire bench is aptly stated in Great Falls
Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444, 460 (1867):
Our soil and climate forbid us to enter into competition with the great producing
States of the Union, in the sale of such agricultural productions as are sent
to the great markets of the country; we are purchasers, and not vendors, of such
productions. The prosperity of the farmer mainly depends with us on having
close at hand a market for such products of his farm as cannot be advantageously
transported for long distances, and in which he does not come into competition
with the great producers of the West. Such a market can be furnished only by
his neighbors, who are engaged in mechanical and manufacturing pursuits. The
farmer, therefore, has an obvious and deep interest in those pursuits; and large
manufacturing establishments not only afford a market for agricultural productions, but give profitable employment to great numbers of men and women, disburse large sums of money, and create a new demand for wood, timber, and
other commodities.
Similar sentiments were expressed by the New Jersey court in Scudder v. Trenton
Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J.Eq. 694, 728-29 (1832):
May we not, in considering what shall be deemed a public use and benefit, look
at the objects, the purposes, and the results of the undertaking? The water
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A variant justification began to emerge as well, however. The
Massachusetts courts, perhaps troubled by the full implications of the
public utility analysis, carefully examined the nature of the property
right taken from the flooded upstream owner. The right was stated
74
to be more in the nature of an easement than a fee simple absolute,
and it was further determined, in effect, that all riparian property
was held subject to this commonly known, potentially preemptive
power about to be created, will be sufficient for the erection of seventy mills, and
factories, and other works dependent on such power. It will be located at the
seat of government, at the head of tide water, and in a flourishing and populous
district of country. It will be no experiment in a country like ours; and, judging
from the results in other places, we may make a sufficiently accurate calculation
as to the result here. Take the town of Paterson as an example. The water power
there is in the hands of individuals-a company like this. They are under no
obligation to lease or sell any mills or privileges to the public; and yet see the
result of a few years' operation. Paterson is now the manufacturing emporium
of the state, with a population of eight thousand souls. It has increased the value
of property in all that district of country; opened a market for the produce of
the soil, and given a stimulus to industry of every kind. May we not hope that
a similar benefit may be experienced here?
Two decades after Proprietors of Sudbury Meadows v. Proprietors of Middlesex
Canal, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 36 (1839), the canal had doubtlessly been largely supplanted
by improved roads and railroads. The meadow proprietors, armed with a new special
statute, wished to free their lands of the waters cast back by the canal company's
dam, approved in the earlier decision. The court allowed this to be done in Talbot
v. Hudson, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 417 (1860). In commenting on the vagaries that the
meadows had undergone at the hands of the proprietors operating under various
special legislative acts, the court delivered the following pronouncement:
It is certainly difficult to see any good reason for making a discrimination . . .
[as to the legislative conferment of the powers of eminent domain] between different
branches of industry. If it is lawful and constitutional to advance the manufacturing
or mechanical interests of a section of the State by allowing individuals acting
primarily for their own profit to take private property [referring to the milldam
acts], there would seem to be little, if any, room for doubt as to the authority
of the legislature, acting as the representatives of the whole people, to make a
similar appropriation by their own immediate agents [the proprietors of the
meadows] in order to promote the agricultural interests of a large territory.
Id. at 427. This, of course, illustrates precisely the troublesome ultimate extension of
the doctrine of public utility as public use. The power in the hands of the meadow
proprietors may be explicable by the drainage precedents to be considered next. See
pp. 67-76 infra. But if any corporation qua corporation acts for the "public use" in
the sense of generalized public utility, or is a legitimate representative of a generic
segment of the economy as set over against other such segments (e.g., agriculture versus
manufacturing), it is most difficult to see where the limits may be drawn in conferring
eminent domain powers on corporations. Indeed, as will be noted briefly later, in many
western states these powers are widely conferred on corporations and individuals, albeit
for limited purposes. See p. 75 infra.
74. The flowage right is characterized as an easement or servitude in Otis Co. v.
Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. 140, 153-54 (1906); Bates v. Weymouth Iron Co., 62 Mass.
(8 Cush.) 548, 555 (1851); Boston & Roxbury Mill Dam Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12
Pick.) 467, 482-83 (1832). It is clear from these cases that the dammer did not acquire
the fee in lands flowed, but only the right of encroachment as long as the dam and
pond existed.
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easement that might be created under the operation of the hoary milldam acts. 75 It was well-settled that riparian owners had mutual, correlative rights in the use of the stream water as it flowed past their
various properties.76 The dammer's inchoate easement was characterized as a permissible instance of the adjustment of these mutual rights
among the owners along a streamcourse.17 This rationale is quite dubious on one level, for the adjustment of true :correlative rights in a
flow resource can hardly be equated with the unilateral, preemptive
right in one owner to dam and consequently to flood upstream owners.
A mirror-image justification exists, however. Were upstream owners
able to stand firm on property rights and block or seek unconscionable
reparations from a dam builder, development of the innate energy
of the watercourse would consistently be deterred or blocked. This
"adjustment" of rights should perhaps be understood as
giving any
owner, and therefore all owners equally, the opportunity to move
first in erecting a dam. The first owner to exercise this right then preempted its exercise by his upstream neighbors along the level of his
millpond. 7s And this preemption was necessarily accompanied by the
75. See Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. 140, 153-54 (1906); Cary v. Daniels, 49
Mass. (8 Met.) 466, 476-77 (1844).
76. See cases cited note 75 supra. This included the right to make use of its natural
gravitational fall for power generation purposes.
77. See Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. 140, 155-54 (1906); Bates v. Weymouth Iron Co., 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 548, 553 (1851); Murdock v. Stickney, 62 Mass. (8
Cush.) 113, 116 (1851). In the eyes of the Massachusetts courts the milldam acts were
a form of police power regulation, not of eminent domain. See Murdock v. Stickney,
supra. The effect of the acts was to adjust rights that were correlative, or held in
common among owners along affected portions of a stream. See Fiske v. Framingbam
Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 68, 70-72 (1884); Bates v. Weymouth Iron Co., supra at
552-53. But cf. Talbot v. Hudson, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 417, 426 (1860), indicating that
the Massachusetts act could be considered an exercise of the power of eminent domain;
the case is cited to this effect in Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 115 U.S. 9, 19 (1885).
See also discussion, note 79 infra.
78. The case in which this rationale was firmly adopted was Cary v. Daniels, 49
Mass. (8 Met.) 466, 477 (1844):
It seems to follow, as a necessary consequence from these [physical principles of
damming] . . . that in such case, the proprietor who first erects his dam for such
a [milling] purpose has a right to maintain it, as against the proprietors above
and below; and to this extent, prior occupancy gives a prior title to such use.
It is a profitable, beneficial, and reasonable use, and therefore one which he has
a right to make. . . . For the same reason, the proprietor below cannot erect a
dam in such a manner as to raise the water and obstruct the wheels of the first
occupant. He had an equal right with the proprietor below to a reasonable
use of the stream; he had made only a reasonable use of it; his appropriation
to that extent, being justifiable and prior in time, necessarily prevents the
proprietor below from raising the water, without interfering with a rightful use
already made; and it is therefore not an injury to him. Such appears to be the
nature and extent of the prior and exclusive right, which one proprietor acquires
by a prior reasonable appropriation of the use of the water in its fall; and it
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occupancy of overflowed lands. Viewed in this somewhat tortuous
light, the milldam acts were characterized in Massachusetts not as invoking the power of eminent domain, but as legitimate police power
of rights held in comregulations for the adjustment and furtherance
9
stream.7
a
along
owners
mon by riparian
When the United States Supreme Court finally considered the
matter, it reviewed and upheld a New Hampshire milldam statute on
the basis of the rationale developed in the Massachusetts courts. The
Court analogized the affected ownership rights to those of tenants in
common. 0 Statutory and common law devices existed for breaking a
deadlock when tenants in common did not agree on the use of their
property.81 These precedents were cited as relevant, if not controlling,
in support of the milldam acts, which were thus characterized as legitimate uses of police power regulation. Although a substantial twisting
of fact is needed to compare a disagreement among co-tenants to the
act of a dammer in casting pond waters onto the properties of private

results, not from any originally superior legal right, but from a legitimate exercise
of his own common right, the effect of which is, de facto, to supersede and
prevent a like use by other proprietors originally having the same common
right.
Note from the above excerpt that due to physical reality, the dam had a preemptive
effect both upstream and down. A downstream owner was precluded from erecting a
dam that would push water against the dam of an upstream owner, thereby pro tanto
reducing the vertical fall of water available to the upstream dammer for water power
purposes. The dammer likewise preempted vertical fall along the level of his millpond
as far as it extended upstream. Viewed in this light, the "property" subjected to prior
appropriation was perhaps the vertical fall of water, with the flowage of land then
viewed as a subordinate incident of the appropriation. No compensation was payable
under the act for destruction of that portion of the market value of riparian lands
attributable to adaptability for mill purposes. Fuller v. Chicopee Mfg. Co., 82 Mass. (16
Gray) 43 (1860).
For a compendious and detailed statement of the effects and operations of the
Massachusetts act, see Brief for Plaintiff at 141-47, Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201
U.S. 140 (1906).
79. See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 21-23 (1885). This characterization
in Head had the important consequence of enabling the Supreme Court to deal with
the case as involving an exercise of the police power. See note 77 supra. The Court
explicitly refrained from treating the case as one involving the power of eminent
domain, Head v. Amoskeag, supra at 20-21; by so doing the Court avoided the need
to determine the propriety of the delegation of eminent domain to private individuals
under the public-use-as-public-utility rationale. Going beyond the narrowly stated
basis of the case (adjustment of rights held in common), it seems unquestionable
that the police power may be exercised for the general adjustment of private rights
on grounds of public utility and benefit, whereas these grounds are a highly suspect
basis for the bestowal of eminent domain powers on individuals and corporations. See
note 73 supra.
80. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 21-23 (1885).
81. Id.; see notes 73, 77, 79 supra.
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owners upstream, the analogy becomes more tenable if the doctrine
of correlative damming rights of riparians is taken seriously.
The question of public purpose did not deter the Supreme Court.
The question having been long settled in the courts and legislature
of New Hampshire and by customary practice in the state, the Supreme Court considered the matter so properly resolved and determined
that it presented no question of federal constitutional rights82 When
no blatant violation of federal constitutional guarantees is presented,
and the public purpose question is resolved in light of local cincumstances, exigencies or custom, this posture of the Supreme Court in
ratifying local practice is not unusual.
Summary of the Relation of Legal Doctrine to Development Rights.
-The cluster of legal precedents surrounding the milldam acts is useful for two principal purposes. First, in several jurisdictions the perceived multiplier effect of water power on the employment and industrial base of the state served to advance the public-use-as-publicutility concept with such vigor that the multiplier effect became a
sufficient justification for placing eminent domain powers in the hands
of private dammers. We suggest later that proper management of land
resources by use of development rights may produce major, beneficial
multiplier effects. While there is no proposal that any use of eminent
domain be made in this connection, it should be remembered that the
multiplier effect of resource use and exigencies of that use in the
case of milldams have been held sufficient to justify the private use of
eminent domain in some states.
Second, the courts developed the doctrine that the milldam statutes
were reasonable police power regulations for the adjustment and
protection of the exercise of the correlative rights of individual owners that arose from their shared relation to a common resource. In the
case of milldams, the absolute physical necessity of flooding upstream
owners (and their converse ability to block dams or demand an exorbitant price) perhaps eased the application of this doctrine. Subsequently,
more refined and tenuous versions of the doctrine of correlative rights
in a commonly shared resource use will be discussed; it is one of the
cornerstones of the proposed development rights system.
C. Major Drainageand IrrigationProjects
Although drainage and irrigation projects sought diametrically
opposite physical results, they went forward under comparable legal

82. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 20-26
Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. 140, 151 (1906).

(1885); see Otis Co. v. Ludlow
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structures and evoked similar judicial response. They will be considered together.
Drainage and irrigation required large amounts of front-end capital
for the construction of facilities that would produce chiefly deferred
benefits. Government could properly have paid these initial costs but
did not typically do so in the 1800's, creating instead legal strutctures
for private-sector enterprise to accomplish these ends.85 With both
drainage and irrigation, there was relatively little actual acquisition
of property. Transportation systems and millponds were characterized
by actual physical occupancy of affected properties. Drainage and
irrigation districts also occupied property, for example, for rights-ofway, dams and reservoirs, ' but the vast majority of properties affected

were those benefited by the projects, not those occupied by them.
The legal mechanisms widely adopted to effect these projects
were created by statute and were relatively straightforward in structure. Upon petition to a local court by the qualifying owners of a
stated percentage of lands within a proposed district, commissioners
83. Drainage of marshes and overflowed lands was a practice in the Eastern States
from very early times. See, e.g., statutes and practices discussed in Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (involving a Willson drainage corporation); Proprietors of Sudbury Meadows v. Proprietors of Middlesex Canal, 40 Mass. (23
Pick.) 36 (1839); Hoagland v. Wurts, 41 N.J.L. 175, 179 (1879) (terming special legislation for the drainage of meadows "a branch of legislation that has existed in this
state from the earliest times"); Coster v. Tide Water Co., 18 N.J.Eq: 54, 69 (1866) (mentioning that the court had been referred to hundreds of private drainage acts in New
York and New Jersey); Belknap v. Belknap, 2 Johns. Ch. 463 (N.Y. Ch. 1817); Phillips
v. Thompson, 1 Johns. Ch. 130 (N.Y. Ch. 1814). In tidal areas and along some of the
inland rivers, drainage was accomplished by building levees to repel the onslaught of
tides or floods. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (involving a levee); Eldridge
v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896) (involving Louisiana levee practices); Willson v.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., supra; Coster v. Tide Water Co., supra. Widespread
irrigation arose only as the West was settled, and then largely west of the 100th
principal meridian. See, e.g., Lake Koen Navigation, Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Klein,
65 P. 684 (Kan. 1901), discussing a statutory scheme indicating legislative intent to
authorize irrigation in Kansas west of the 99th meridian.
84. See, e.g., the following cases involving powers in a district to condemn a rightof-way for the conveyance of water: O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915); Merrill v.
Southside Irrigation Co., 44 P. 720 (Cal. 1896); to condemn a portion of an existing
irrigation canal: Portneuf Irrigating Co. v. Budge, 100 P. 1046 (Idaho 1909); to condemn bottomland for a reservoir: Lake Koen Navigation, Reservoir & Irrigation Co.
v. Klein, 65 P. 684 (Kan. 1901); Paxton & Hershey Irrigating Canal & Land Co. v.
Farmers' & Merchants' Irrigation & Land Co., 64 N.W. 343 (Neb. 1895). In usages such
as these, of course, the districts held powers of eminent domain and proceeded under
them. When drainage involved the land of but a few individuals, infliction of impact
outside of the drainage area, as by interfering with the water supply of established
mills, raised troublesome problems of the private use of eminent domain. See Belknap
v. Belknap, 2 Johns Ch. 463 (N.Y. Ch. 1817) (decided on ultra vires grounds); but
such powers were granted in the special act under review in Phillips v. Thompson, 1
Johns. Ch. 130 (N.Y. Ch. 1814).
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were appointed and empowered by the court to investigate and report on the economic feasibility of the project and the territorial extent of the proposed district. One or more hearings were held to consider the economic and physical feasibility of the project, to set
boundaries of the project area and to assess charges on a ratable basis
against the properties within the project in accordance with the expected benefits. Notice to affected property owners was given and
there was the right of appeal from contested determinations. 5
The startling, basic premise of these acts was that a majority of
property owners could by vote, under statutory authorization and
court supervision, impose their vision of desirable land use on an ob-

jecting minority. The imposition was in part physical and in part
financial. In the case of drainage, the majoritarian imposition caused
the alteration of the physical characteristics of the lands involved.
There would have been no way to exclude any interior landholdings
from the effects of a lowered water table, something a rice grower, for
instance, might have wished. As with the milldams, then, an unwilling
owner was clearly shorn of the ability to block the project on grounds
that the physical nature of his land might not be altered without his
consent.8 6 Within an irrigation district, by contrast, there would have
85. See generally the statutory structures under review, and statutes and cases
cited in Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Clough, 242 US. 375 (1917); O'Neill v. Learner, 239
U.S. 244 (1915); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896); Wurts v.
Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606 (1885); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701 (1884);
In re Bonds of Madera Irrigation Dist., 28 P. 272 (Cal. 1891); Lake Koen Navigation,
Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Klein, 65 P. 684 (Kan. 1901); Coomes v. Burt, 39 Mass. (22
Pick.) 422 (1839); Lundberg v. Green River Irrigation Dist., 119 P. 1039 (Utah 1911).
All of these cases contain review of various aspects of due process requirements surrounding the formation of districts and the levy of betterment assessments.
86. This was assumed, sub silentio, in Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 US. 606 (1885);
Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 US. 701 (1884). The author has found no
case in which physical alteration of drained land was raised and treated as an issue
separate from larger questions of the validity of overall public purposes served by
drainage projects. An owner's denial that he was receiving any benefits, see note 87
infra, did not raise the issue. Physical alteration offsite, such as reduced water flow
to milldams, was treated in a few cases. See, e.g., Belknap v. Belknap, 2 Johns. Ch. 462
(N.Y. Ch. 1817); Phillips v. Thompson, 1 Johns. Ch. 130 (N.Y. Ch. 1814). The closest
approach to direct discussion of the issue is that of Beasley, C.J., in Hoagland v. Wurts,
41 N.J.L. 175, 177-79 (1879):
If the law in question were defensible alone on the ground that it is an
emanation of the legislative power in its ordinary exercise, I should be constrained to yield my assent to . . . [the contention that the statute is invalid].
There is nothing that I know of in the nature of legislation that could stand as
a warrant for such an enactment. To make this evident, all we have to do is
to realize fully the character of the authority thus assumed. The purpose of
the law is to enable one set of land owners to compel another set to co-operate,
against their will, to drain that body of meadow land in which they have
separate interests. The persons thus coerced manifestly suffer an invasion of their
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been no inevitable alteration in the physical nature of property (ignoring generalized effects such as seepage and a somewhat raised water
table). As a physical reality, an owner rcould have elected not to use
any project water while continuing his nonirrigated uses without disruption.87
Despite the sharp difference in the inevitability of physical effects
ordinary proprietary rights. Why should they thus be forced either to improve
their own land or help to improve the land of others? ...
But, nevertheless, I think this act, with respect to its general scope and operation, is to be vindicated. The right to appoint methods for the drainage
of meadows has been a branch of legislation that has existed in this state from
the earliest times, and has been so frequently exercised and acknowledged, that
it has become a part of the local common law.
The physical necessity of draining the land of all owners within a drainage district
is mentioned in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 163-64 (1896).
87. The dissident owner's asserted right to do precisely this was reviewed in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896). Mrs. Bradley's property was
susceptible of beneficial use without the necessity of water for irrigation and had for
several years been used for beneficial purposes other than cultivation by irrigation. Id.
at 166. It was nonetheless assessed for irrigation benefit in the amount of $51.31, and
when Mrs. Bradley refused to pay the assessment, the land was sold to collect the
amount. Id. at 121-23.
Contrasting the necessity of physical invasion in the case of milldams and the
necessity of physical alteration in the case of drainage districts, Mrs. Bradley argued
that she was being compelled to take and pay for water whether she wanted it or not,
without any physical necessity for the compulsion. Brief for Appellees at 137-39, Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, supra. The Supreme Court did not agree:
If land which can, to a certain extent, be beneficially used without artificial irrigation, may yet be so much improved by it that it will be thereby and for its
original use substantially benefited, and, in addition to the former use, though
not in exclusion of it, if it can then be put to other and more remunerative uses,
we think it erroneous to say that the furnishing of artificial irrigation to that
kind of land cannot be, in a legal sense, a public improvement, or the use of
the water a public use.
Id. at 167. In so holding, the Supreme Court relied heavily on an earlier California
case that approved the inclusion of the city of Modesto within an irrigation district
although many improved properties within the city would assertibly receive no benefit
from the availability of irrigation water. Board of Directors of Modesto Irrigation
Dist. v. Tregea, 26 P. 237 (Cal. 1891). The Supreme Court interpreted as includable
within the irrigation district all lands that in their natural state were susceptible of
receiving benefits from irrigation. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112,
164-67 (1896), citing Board of Directors of Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Tregea, 26 P. 237,
241-42 (Cal. 1891). Thus, under statutory mandate by the California Legislature, as
approved by the courts, the physical reality that an owner could have refused to participate in an irrigation district gave way to the legal reality that he could not do so.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court bolstered this approach by noting that an owner,
having been compelled to take a share of irrigation project water and pay for the
benefits thereby conferred, was at liberty to sell or assign any irrigation water in excess
of his needs and thus to offset or perhaps to recoup the amount of the assessment. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 162-63 (1896). This is comparable to the
ability of a property owner to sell development rights.
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on lands caused by drainage and irrigation, compulsory charges computed on the basis of "benefits" received were assessed on all "benefited" properties within both types of districts. 8 From the perspective
of physical reality, there was no compelling reason for this to have
been so, at least in the case of irrigation districts. In fact the assessment process, especially as applied within irrigation districts, apparently reflected a decision grounded more in fiscal reality than in any
unalterable exigency arising from the reality of resource use. An
owner of lands to be drained, protesting that he did not want the
physical nature of his property altered, could not block the project.8
Short of blockage, however, he might be seeking a "free ride," that
is, to receive the immediate and inevitable benefits of the drainage
from which he could not be excluded, while being excused from paying any of the costs because of his protestation that he neither wanted
nor would receive any "benefit." The free-rider situation does not
exist as clearly in the irrigation case, since owners not desiring irrigation water could certainly have been allowed to deal themselves out
by binding contract. Ambigiously in the case of drainage and more
clearly in the case of irrigation, it can be asserted that the principal
use of the assessment for "benefits" was to compel the assemblage of
front-end capital without which the projects could not have been
undertaken by private sector activity.
Two further points need mention. By statutory definition, districts
could typically include only lands that would be benefited by a common form of reclamation.9" The actual delineation of the area to be
included within a district was frequently a highly judgmental matter,
however. Terrain elevations and the gravity-flow characteristic of
water were to some extent determinative, but with improvements in
construction abilities and pumping technology, and the resultant increases in project size, choices arose and were made concerning the
inclusion of major additional areas within projects. 91
Further, determination of the value of project benefits to particular
tracts was highly subjective and often precipitated intense controversy.
Benefits could not be pure fiction-a desert could not be charged with

88. See generally notes 85 & 87 supra.
89. See note 87 supra.
90. See note 85 supra.
91. See, e.g., Board of Directors of Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Tregea, 26 P. 237, 244
(Cal. 1891), in which the decision was belatedly made to exclude 28,000 acres from
the originally proposed 108,000-acre district. In this case an offer of proof was made,
which the court held was correctly rejected, that the inclusion of Modesto within the
district was a gerrymander to assemble enough favorable votes from city residents to
override the opposition of outlying farmers to the formation of the district. Id. at 243.
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a drainage assessment, nor a swamp with irrigation benefits.92 Short
of this, however, intermediate cases involving marginal benefit were
quite troublesome. For example, a tract arable for many purposes
under natural rainfall might receive only slight benefit from irrigation, or an owner might protest with complete sincerity that he wanted
no irrigation water and would relinquish all rights to it. Within the
gross structural frameworks for delimiting districts and establishing
assessment rates, then, there existed many difficult individual situations in which finely tuned and totally persuasive objectivity was an
elusive goal.

3

92. See, e.g., Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 478 (1916), in which
the drainage district for a low lying coastal area attempted to embrace and to assess
for drainage betterments a geologically anomalous "island" that rose to a height of 175
feet above the plain, suffered from excessive drainage and erosion under natural circumstances, and happened to be the most valuable single piece of property within the
district. The Supreme Court struck down the inclusion and assessment of the "island"
within the district in the following language:
It is to be remembered that a drainage district has the special purpose of the
improvement of particular property and when it is so formed to include property
which is not and cannot be benefited directly or indirectly, including it only
that it may pay for the benefit to other property, there is an abuse of power
and an act of confiscation.
Id. at 485.
On a broader level, the determination that lands within the district would benefit
from the proposed system of drainage or irrigation was a jurisdictional one-it was
one of the threshhold questions that required an affirmative answer before a drainage
or irrigation district could be created under the typical statute. See Lake Shore & M.S.
Ry. v. Clough, 242 U.S. 375 (1917); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112,
175-78 (1896).
93. Perhaps the best general statement is to be found in Hagar v. Reclamation
Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 705 (1884):
The expense of such works may be charged against parties specially benefited,
and be made a lien upon their property. All that is required in such cases is
that the charges shall be apportioned in some just and reasonable mode, according
to the benefit received. Absolute equality in imposing them may not be reached;
only an approximation to it may be attainable. If no direct and invidious discrimination in favor of certain persons to the prejudice of others be made, it is
not a valid objection to the mode pursued that, to some extent, inequalities may
arise.
In a specific situation, the Supreme Court of California, in Board of Directors of
Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. Tregea, 26 P. 237, 242 (Cal. 1891), had this to say:
If this objection was good ground for excluding the city from the district, it
is probable that no district could ever be successfully organized; for, in the nature
of things, an irrigation district must cover an extensive tract of land, and, no
matter how purely rural and agricultural the community may be, there must
exist here and there within its limits a shop or warehouse covering a limited
extent of ground that can derive no direct benefit from the use of water for
irrigation..
It is assertible that the courts foresaw and moved to forestall a plethora of suits
on the merits by individuals whose lands had been assessed by drainage and irrigation
districts. In any event, the judicial approach of the United States Supreme Court was:
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The basic analogue adopted by the courts in approving the legal

structure of these districts was the variation on taxation known as
the "special assessment," through which a charge is assessed against
property for a benefit peculiarly conferred on the property by a
public or quasi-public expenditure. 4 The use of the doctrine in this
,context is a bit more startling than it may first appear. The levy of a
monetary assessment may not seem like the "taking" of property that
occurred with milldams and railroads. It is certainly not an immediate
physical occupancy. The charge was assessed against the land,
however, and in the event of nonpayment the land could be
sold to satisfy the charge.9 5 The special assessment had the potential
to eventuate in seizure of the land of a financially hard-pressed owner. And the monetary charge (and actual physical alteration in the
case of drainage) was imposed by majoritarian action. It would certainly seem an unheard-of proposition if the owners of the majority
of homes in a block rcould elect an expensive scheme of neighborhood
improvement, perhaps make alterations to a dissenting owner's pro(1) to give initial broad review to the validity of the purposes and general structure
of the districts, see, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896); Wurts
v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606 (1885); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701
(1884); (2) to decide additional cases that related specifically to assessment procedures
and theories, see, e.g., Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254 (1915); O'Neill
v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244 (1915); (3) to stake the outer limits of permissible inequities
in assessments, see, e.g., Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 478 (1915);
and (4) thereafter to leave the matter with inferior courts with a strong presumption of
administrative regularity in proceedings within the districts, see, e.g., Houck v. Little
River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254 (1915).
94. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 704-06 (1884). See also Houck
v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1915); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 176-78 (1896); excerpt from Hagar, note 93 supra. But cf. Wurts
v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606, 611, 614 (1885), in which the Supreme Court appears to
adopt the rationale, developed in the New Jersey courts, that statutes authorizing
the formation of drainage districts by majority action of the affected landowners were
based on the police power and not on the power of taxation, despite the ability of
the districts to assess each owner for betterments. See also the excerpt from Wurts,
note 86 supra. A second species of drainage statute used in New Jersey chartered private corporations to drain marshes, thereby producing general public benefit as well
as special private benefit to landowners within the drained areas. In reviewing the
powers of these chartered drainage corporations the New Jersey courts had held that
private inholders could not constitutionally be assessed for costs of improvements in
amounts greater than the actual benefits conferred on their properties. Costs greater
than the amount of private benefits conferred were required to be levied on the public
at large, on the theory that these costs had created only public benefit. Tide-water Co.
v. Coster, 18 N.J.Eq. 518, 526-31 (N.J. Ct. Err. 1866). This was, of course, an application
of taxation doctrines.
95. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 US. 112 (1896); Hagar v.
Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701 (1884), both of which involved actions by
landowners to block the forced sale of their property to satisfy betterment charges
assessed by the districts within which the properties were situated.
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perty, and impose a ratable share of sizeable costs on his property, with
the ability to compel sale of the property to pay the charge if necessary.
Yet this, from the point of view of a dissident property owner, is just
what was done under the drainage and irrigation statutes.98 The judicial approval of these very considerable modifications of individual
property rights may perhaps be best understood in light of the interaction of several factors-the definition of public "use" adopted, the
peculiarities of the resource to be put to public "use" and the underlying capital funding problem.
When 5,000 acres of bog were drained or arid land irrigated, it
was clear that the general public did not have the direct right of a
user in the benefits created as it had in the case of turnpikes,
canals, railroads and grist mills. Direct use of the benefits was confined
to the owners of the affected tracts. The judicial response to this problem was that the user, to be public, need not inevitably create practical
user benefits in the entire public. For instance, an isolated rural school
district including but a few farm homesteads was nevertheless unarguably a public use. In the case of drainage and irrigation as well,
a proper public user constituency was felt to derive from the landrelated status of property owners within the district benefited by the
improvement. 97 This line of reasoning was coupled with another line
of analysis discussed previously-that relating to public "use" in terms
of public utility and efficiency. It will be recalled that enabling statutes
considered here inevitably contain explicit or implicit legislative findings that drainage and irrigation districts are conducive to the productive good of the state involved. In reviewing such statutes, [courts ratified the legislative determination of public utility and added their
own endorsements to the general prosperity expected to flow from the
utilization of the drainage or irrigation statutes under review. 98
96. For a comparable judicial characterization of the results, see excerpt quoted
note 86 supra.
97. O'Neill v. Learner, 239 U.S. 244 (1915); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,
164 U.S. 112, 160-63 (1896); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 704-06
(1884); In re Madera Irrigation Dist., 28 P. 272 (Cal. 1891). The analysis of public
benefits versus private benefits that arose in New Jersey courts, see note 94 supra, involved a massive drainage project in the flat coastal plains of that state. See Tide-water
Co. v. Coster, 18 N.J.Eq. 518, 520-21 (N.J. Ct. Err. 1866). The project involved a marsh
covering about one-fourth of Hudson County and several thousand acres in Union
County, New Jersey. This marsh was comparatively useless and undevelopable in its
natural condition, and it was exceedingly difficult to construct roads and railroads
across the marsh to connect the towns on its borders. Id.
98. Drainage could, of course, typically be justified as protecting public health. See
Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 (1900).
We think that the trial court might well take judicial notice that the public
health is deeply concerned in the reclamation of swamp and overflowed lands.
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The resources involved in these districts were of a peculiar character, consisting of individually owned tracts of land in roughly common
situations due to topographic and hydrologic conditions. Private
tracts of land otherwise unrelated were thus thrown together into a
forced, cooperative unit due to their common situation and reclamation potential. Here, as in the fcase of the milldam acts, individual

properties sharing a common resource-use potential were blocked into
a unit delimited by the resource use, and individual rights in the
tracts of land involved were diminished radically in furtherance of
the development of the resource. 99 This common-resource or commonIf there is any fact which may be supposed to be known by everybody, and,
therefore, by the courts, it is that swamps and stagnant waters are the cause
of malarial and malignant fevers, and that the police power is never more
legitimately exercised than in removing such nuisances.
Id. at 636.
In Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 704 (1884), the Supreme
Court coupled community prosperity with community health as legitimate ends that
might be served by drainage. Then in Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606, 615 (1885), reliance on the public health justification was omitted, and the rationale of the beneficial development of commonly-situated properties was espoused. The Court next used
the dual rationales of commonly-situated property and public utility in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896). In upholding the state legislature's determination of public utility, the Court stated:
While the consideration that the work of irrigation must be abandoned if the
use of the water may not be held to be or constitute a public use is not to be
regarded as conclusive in favor of such use, yet that fact is in this case a
most important consideration. Millions of acres of land otherwise cultivable
must be left in their present arid and worthless condition, and an effectual
obstacle will therefore remain in the way of the advance of a large portion of
the State in material wealth and prosperity. To irrigate and thus to bring
into possible cultivation these large masses of otherwise worthless lands would
seem to be a public purpose and a matter of public interest, not confined to
the landowners, or even to any one section of the State.
Id. at 161.
99. In the final analysis, the substantive power of the drainage and irrigation
districts to block up similarly situated lands seems to be based on the police power.
The special assessment analogy provided the necessary doctrinal base for the assessment of betterment charges. See note 94 supra. It was solely relied upon in Hagar v.
Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701 (1884), and no mention was made therein
of the common resource or common property theory. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113
U.S. 9 (1885), did not reach the Court until the following year.
In Head the Court clearly adopted the common property analogies and cited
drainage district cases as invoking this rationale for regulation. Id. at 21-26.
In Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606 (1885), the Court incorporated into its conceptual scheme the New Jersey doctrine that drainage statutes authorizing majoritarian
action by landowners within a district were based on the police power. See note 94 supra.
As the Court had done earlier in Head, the Court in Wurts posited the existence of a
generic category of resources that due to commonality of situation and exigency of development might be validly subjected to the peculiar genre of police power regulation
under review. 114 U.S. at 611, 614.
In Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 163 (1896), the Court swept
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property theory was in fact directly adopted by the Supreme Court in
major cases dealing with both drainage and irrigation districts:
If it be essential or material for the prosperity of the community,
and if the improvement be one in which all the landowners have
to a certain extent a common interest, and the improvement cannot be accomplished without the concurrence of all or nearly all of
such owners by reason of the peculiar natural condition of the tract
sought to be reclaimed, then such reclamation may be made and
the land rendered useful to all and at their joint expense. In such
case the absolute right of each individual owner of land must yield
to a certain extent or be modified by corresponding rights on the
part of other owners for what is declared upon the whole to be for
the public benefit. 00
Parenthetically, in some of the Western States the intensely predominant value and the exigencies of the use of certain resources
produced a logical conclusion of one theme previously noted-the
power of eminent domain was accorded to one private individual
over the lands of another for specified purposes such as conveying
water and ore. The immense value and multiplier effect on the local
economies from resource use and the frequent ability of a dissident
landowner to effect total blockage of a neighbor's use combined to
justify the conferral of eminent domain powers on private individu01
als.
irrigation districts into this generic category of resources. Taking these cases together,
it is fair to say that this category of resources is subject to regulation under a specialized
branch of the police power that permits the use of elements of eminent domain or
special assessment if necessary to accomplish the purposes at hand and to achieve
rough equity among the various property owners involved. See p. 77 infra.
100. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 163 (1896); accord, Wurts
v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606, 614 (1885); note 99 supra.
101. See, e.g., Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906) (upholding a Utah statute authorizing acquisition of private right-of-way to carry ore);
Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905) (upholding a Utah statute that permitted one individual to acquire a right-of-way across lands of another where necessary to convey
irrigation water); Oury v. Goodwin, 26 P. 376 (Ariz. 1891) (private right-of-way for
irrigation); Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1876) (private
mining right-of-way). The following excerpt gives a flavor of the spirit and realities
of the times in which these acts were passed and upheld:
Mining is the greatest of the industrial pursuits in this state. All other interests
are subservient to it. Our mountains are almost barren timber, and our valley
lands could never be made profitable for agricultural purposes except for the
fact of a home market having been created by the mining developments in
different sections of the state. The mining and milling interests give employment
to many men, and the benefits derived from this business are distributed as
much, and sometimes more, among the laboring classes than with the owners of
the mines and mills. The mines are fixed by the laws of nature, and are often
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It must be noted again, however, that the inevitable effects of
shared resource use and project impact diminished greatly from the
case within the drainage districts to the ;case within the irrigation
districts. In fact, it is arguable that in the case of irrigation districts
the capital funding motive is clearly dominant, supported only weakly by the majoritarian nature of the action and scarcely at all by any
inevitability of common resource use. In the case of the transportation
systems and milldams, physical invasion of property was unavoidable
and compensation was paid. Within the drainage districts, alteration
of all properties and conferment of "benefit" was inevitable and
charges were assessed accordingly. A dissident irrigation district owner was not allowed to avoid inclusion, however, as he clearly could
have done contractually. Instead, he was made a compulsory con102
The majoritributor to the capitalization of the unwanted project.
tarian winners thus not only received their vision of desirable resource
use, but also they were permitted to dip into the losers' pockets to help
fund the accomplishment of this vision.
Summary of the Relation of Legal Doctrine to Development
Rights.-Drainage and irrigation districts furnish the first example
we have encountered of the assemblage of large tracts of land, as
would have to be done with the planning districts that we suggest.
Public utility in the sense of multiplier effect of resources being put
to use is again a dominant notion. 10 3 The community of interest in
Now it so happens, or, at least, is liable
found in places almost inaccessible ....
to happen, that individuals, by securing a title to the barren lands adjacent to
the mines, mills or works, have it within their power, by unreasonably refusing
to part with their lands for a just and fair compensation, which capital is always
willing to give without litigation, to greatly embarrass if not entirely defeat the
business of mining in such localities. . . . Nature has denied to this state
many of the advantages which other states possess; but by way of compensation
to her citizens has placed at their doors the richest and most extensive silver
deposits ever yet discovered. The present prosperity of the state is entirely due
to the mining developments already made, and the entire people of the state are
directly interested in having the future developments unobstructed by the obstinate action of any individual or individuals.
Id. at 409-10. To allay a nagging sense of deja vu, see the comparable rationale expressed
as to the New Hampshire milldam act, note 73 supra.
102. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 165-70 (1896).
103. We should note the radical reversal in perceptions of the social value of resources, as between the materials covered in notes 83-102 supra, and the extremely
recent resource-preservation cases at notes 29-54 supra. The perception that underlies
the milldam cases, the drainage and irrigation districts cases and the private right.
of-way cases from the Western States was that land and natural resources were
being wasted unless they were promptly developed and thus made part of the productive capital stock of society. The perception in the recent preservation cases is that
society is best served over the productive long haul if at least certain types of critical
land resources (e.g. wetlands) are saved from development and left to fulfill
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the resource use supports the judicial invocation of the commonlyowned property analogy. Of more immediate relevance to the consideration of development rights is the fact that ownership and use of
the affected lands remained in their respective individual owners.
Lands were not taken by occupancy as with railroads and milldams.
In the development rights scheme, lands would likewise remain in
the hands of their owners. The drainage and irrigation districts, however, by making services available, were empowered to assess and to
rcollect a related charge commensurate with the "benefit" conferred
on individual owners. In planning districts making use of development rights, there could result benefits of greatly improved planning
analysis and control and much more equitable distribution of development entitlements. Exigencies and commonality of resource use
within the development rights districts would certainly seem as high
as those found adequate to justify the assessment processes of the irrigation districts. In contrast to assessments, however, as will be discussed later, 0 4 it could well be that the net monetary returns would
be higher on land developed by use of development rights than under
present practices. It would then seem that the development district
approach would find strong justification from the drainage and irrigation district precedents and in fact might be considered an even more
acceptable device than were they.
D. Oil and Gas Production Regulations
The next major body of precedent, and perhaps the most informative, arose around the development of oil and gas resources. Oil and
gas commonly occur together within a rather extensive geologic stratum (a "pool," "formation," "reservoir" or "field") that underlies
their vital natural functions. The rapidity and extent of this policy shift are
best illustrated by the situation described in Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco
Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Ct. App. 1970). The marshland there
involved had been included in a drainage and reclamation district created in 1955 under
legislative finding that "compelling economic necessity exists for the reclaiming . . . of
tidelands . . . [which] now serves no useful purpose for industry, commerce or navigation." Id. at 901. That is a fair statement of the dominant philosophy of the 19th
and first half of the 20th centuries in this nation. Yet the marshland was now included within the jurisdiction of the Commission, whose 1965 enabling statute described the Bay as "the most valuable single natural resource of an entire region"
and mandated the protection of "the present shoreline and body of San Francisco
Bay to the maximum extent possible." Id. at 900-01. See discussion of the impact of this
rapid reversal of policies on the broadly held expectations of landowners, pp. 45-46 supra.
The author's conviction of the need for these new policies, coupled with concern at
the diminution of values and disappointments of landowners expectations that will
result, are two of the principal motivations for writing of this article.
104. See pp. 102-03 infra.
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numerous surface property holdings. Oil and gas are both to some extent migratory within the pool, typically being drawn toward areas of
low pressure such as those created when pressure is lowered around
a producing well. Because of numerous factors, it is impossible to recover all oil and gas from a pool. Initial production ("primary production" or "primary recovery") typically relies on the connate pressure ("energy") within the reservoir to drive gas and some oil to
the surface. This energy is often at least partially in the form of gas
contained within the stratum in the liquid state under extreme presis reduced and
sure. When the gas is brought to the surface, pressure
10 5
form.
gaseous
to
liquid
from
the gas changes
As connate energy from gas or other sources is depleted, production slows and then stops, with much oil and some gas left in place.
Pumping may then be used for additional recovery. The amount of
oil and gas left in place after primary recovery often depends to a
considerable extent on how wisely primary recovery operations are
conducted throughout the formation, that is, on whether the connate
energy forces are harnessed to produce as much gas and oil as possible
before their depletion. After primary recovery, relatively expensive
"secondary recovery" operations may be possible by reinjecting pressuring agents into the stratum to drive some of the remaining oil to
selected recovery wells. Even after secondary recovery, much oil usually remains in place. 1°
Early production practices in this country were simply an all-out
race. Each property owner produced as fast as possible to get as much
oil and gas from his property and to drain as much from his neighbors'
property as he could. This process was assisted and goaded by the
courts' early characterization of oil and gas as fugitive resources,
comparable to wild animals, and not belonging to anyone until "captured," that is, reduced to possession. 10 7 Under the strict rule of cap105. See generally 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 101-04 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS].
106. See generally 1 R. MyERs, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION, VOLUNTARYCOMPULSORY §§ 2.01-.05 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as R. MYERS]; 6 H. WILLIAMS
& C. MEYERS § 901. Primary recovery is ordinarily thought of as that production yielded
solely by the connate energy of the reservoir. Secondary recovery is thought of as
commencing after primary recovery has stopped, or nearly so. The line between the
two is not always clear, however, because some of the same techniques may be used in
both phases of production. For instance, injection of substances to maintain or stimulate
reservoir energy may occur during primary recovery (e.g., reinjection or "cycling" of gas
produced, or certain types of water injection), and may also be used during secondary
recovery operations (e.g., certain types of water injection). Pressure maintenance during
primary recovery may raise the same needs for unitization that are the hallmark of
conventional secondary recovery operations.
107. See State v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 809 (Ind. 1898); Townsend v. State, 47 N.E.
19 (Ind. 1897); Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889).

1974]

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

ture, rapid production of oil and gas was not considered the taking of
another's property. In fact, it made sense for one owner to produce
as rapidly as possible in order to capture as much oil and gas as possible,
thereby making it his property. 108 As many wells as possible would be
drilled as close to property lines as possible in order to drain oil and
gas from under neighboring land. Each neighbor did the same, so
that boundary wells "offset" each other, from one property to the
next. 10 9 It has been said that before regulations were imposed on the
famous East Texas pool, offset wells in many areas resembled picket
fences along the boundary lines. Happy mass slurp.
The results of these practices soon became quite apparent. First,
connate reservoir energy was depleted with extreme rapidity, with
gas often simply being vented into the atmosphere once it had served
the immediate purpose of bringing the more valuable oil to the surface. The rapid depletion of reservoir energy often left trapped in
place much oil that would have been produced by connate energy had
This bizarre characterization was produced by two factors. First, because of the limited
technical information of the times, the courts apparently thought that oil and gas
were literally as migratory as wild game or underground water. Second, given this perception, the courts were obliged to fit oil and gas into one of the available common law
classifications of property rights, and the category of property rights in wild animals
was early selected as a controlling analogy. See State v. Ohio Oil Co., supra; Townsend v.
State, supra; Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, supra.
108. See cases cited in note 107 supra. That is to say, no party had individual
property rights in oil and gas until it had been captured by bringing it to the surface
and reducing it to possession and control. While in repose under an owner's land, oil
and gas were a part of the land and in some inchoate sense "belonged" to the owner.
See Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 669-70 (1895). If drawn away by a neighbor's well
on his property and reduced by him to possession, they then became the property of
the neighbor as captor. See note 116 infra.
109. See note 108 supra. Indeed, there was often no other rational choice in the
matter, for when a new field came in, a frenzied rush usually occurred to capitalize
on the early, high-energy phase of the field's production, called "flush" production. All
owners were compelled to join the race and sell the oil for whatever price it would
fetch, or lose the bulk of the producible oil under their properties to drainage from
neighbors. See Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARv. L. REV. 1209, 1220-21 (1938). A
contemporary observer gave this description:
When once man has started things, this property is mobile, so that the contest
cannot be a leisurely procedure in the courts but of necessity becomes a strenuous
fight on the ground, with drilling rigs and crews racing to reach the oil first
and to reduce to actual possession the elusive and fugitive property. The
ordinary workings of the economic law of supply and demand find no chance
in the business of producing petroleum. The decision to drill does not wait on
market reports; demand for the product is rarely a factor in influencing the
development of oil property-simply the desire to get the oil before someone
else gets it. Thus, as in no other activity, the oil industry throws financial conservatism and business sagacity to the winds and indulges in the primitive
instincts of the chase.
Work, Conservation's Need of Legal Advice, 52 REPORTS OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N 570 (1927).
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the energy been released more slowly. The waste, then, was often
treble-energy inefficiently expended, gas vented and oil needlessly

left in place. 110 Secondly, in the early days of this century, full production so exceeded limited demand that prices plummeted and much oil

was simply and intentionally spilled on the ground."' Finally, the
widespread practice of boundary-line drilling, compelling neighbors
to do the same to offset the drainage, constituted an immense overinvestment in unneeded wells to the extent of an estimated $160,000,000 in the East Texas field alone. Significantly fewer wells would have
been adequate and probably much more efficient in terms of total
primary recovery.?1
The earliest oil and gas regulation cases to come to the attention
of the United States Supreme Court involved efforts of the states
to halt the gross waste of reservoir energy and of gas in particular. The
first case arose when Indiana passed a statute forbidding either gas
or oil to flow into the open air from a well for more than two days
after the well was brought in. 113 Much of central Indiana overlay a
reservoir containing gas and some oil, and the gas was used for cheap,

110. See generally Ely, supra note 109, at 1218-22, depicting and documenting production practices and their consequences. There the estimate is made that rapid, unregulated
production may leave trapped in place between 75% and 90% of the oil, much of
which might have been produced by wisely conducted primary recovery operations. Id.
at 1220. For a review of production practices and their consequences, see Sterling v.
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 388-92, 396-98 (1932) (upholding injunction restraining Governor
of Texas and military officials from enforcing military orders restricting production
from plaintiff's oil wells in East Texas field, martial law having been declared for this
purpose); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 226-32 (1932);
Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 16-18 (1931); Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 310-14 (1920); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 201,
211 (1900).
111. See Ely, supra note 109, at 1213-14, describing the drop in oil prices from
ninety cents to ten cents per barrel when the East Texas field was brought in and
commenced production at the rate of a million barrels per day in 1930-1931. See also
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 226-32 (1932); Hardwicke,
Legal History of Proration of Oil Production in Texas, 56 Tax. BAR Ass'N REPORTS 99,
104-05 (1937); discussion, note 107 supra. The reality was that huge quantities of oil
commanding very low prices could not be stored above ground economically. In the
race for production during the early phase of a field's operations, however, the choices
were simple: a man could let the neighbors drain his property, or he could produce as
rapidly as possible, as the neighbors were doing, store oil as best he could temporarily,
sell as much as possible and dump the rest. As noted in Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, supra at 226-32, some Oklahoma operators in those fields, not having
pipeline connections, were forced to store their production in earthen reservoirs or
let it run at large.
112. Ely, supra note 109, at 1232-33. The author also cites estimates of between
4,000 and 5,000 unnecessary wells drilled annually in that era, at a drilling cost of
between $80 and $100 million. Id.
113. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 190-92 (1900).

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

clean heat and light. 14 Companies dealing solely in oil had recently
entered the field, were massively and rapidly depleting the gas pressure
in order to force to the surface relatively small quantities of oil and
were venting the gas into the atmosphere."15 The Supreme Court concentrated on whether a state could legitimately engage in this genre
of regulation of privately owned oil and gas."16 The Court admitted that
under the common law rule of capture, each surface owner over a
reservoir was at liberty to reduce to possession, without violating the
rights of neighbors 1 7 as much of the gas and oil as possible. However, the Court characterized the oil and gas as a common fund
that did not become an individual landowner's property until captured." 8 It then approved the statute as a valid regulation of the
availability of the common fund to all the owners of lands overlying
it:
But there is a co-equal right in . . . all [owners] to take from a
common source of supply, the two substances which in the nature
of things are united, though separate. It follows from the essence
of their right and from the situation of the things, as to which it can
be exerted, that the use by one of his power to seek to convert a part
of the common fund to actual possession may result in an undue
proportion being attributed to one of the possessors ...

or more, to

the annihilation of the rights of the remainder. Hence it is that
the legislative power, from the peculiar nature of the right and the
objects upon which it is to be exerted, can be manifested for the
purpose of protecting all the collective owners, by securing a just
distribution, to arise from the enjoyment, by them, of their privilege
114. Id. at 192-95.
115. Id. at 195-97.
116. The Court held oil and gas to be "private property" in a peculiar sense. It
conducted a brief review of the common law doctrine, developed in Indiana and other
states, that analogized oil and gas to wild animals. Id. at 203-08; see note 107 supra. It was
settled, however, that wild animals were public things subject to the absolute control
of the state, which could allow, regulate, or wholly forbid their capture. Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). The Court in Ohio Oil noted not only this, but
the further distinction that while all members of the public were empowered to capture
wild animals, that is, to reduce a portion of this peculiar public property to possession
by capturing an animal, in the case of oil and gas only the owners of land overlying a
reservoir had the right to capture the oil and gas beneath their lands. 177 U.S. at 209.
In this sense, the surface owners within an oil and gas field were held to have the exclusive
right to reduce to possession the underlying oil and gas. On this basis, then, oil and
gas in place were held to be private property-a pool resource, subject to the exclusive,
composite right of all overlying surface owners to reduce the resource to possession,
but the individual property of no one surface owner until reduced to possession by
that owner. Id.
117. 177 U.S. at 204-06.
118. Id. at 209-10.
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to reduce to possession, and to reach the like end by preventing
waste.11 9
The Court, therefore, held that the statutory prohibition did not
constitute a taking of the property of the oil companies, although
the statute's operation would likely put the companies out of business.' 20 Thus, oil and gas fields were brought into the fold of resources
that, because of their nature, might be pronounced by legislatures and
ratified by the judiciary as creating a scheme of common relations
among otherwise unrelated individual landowners. This case also
provides the authoritative basis for the existence of correlative rights
among the owners of land overlying an oil and gas field. 12 1 To the
earlier list of three evils of heavy, wasteful oil and gas production,
must now be added a fourth: violation of the correlative rights of other
owners to share in field energy and to produce a ratable share of oil
and gas.
In Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 2 2 the Supreme Court upheld
a Wyoming statute that in practical effect forbade the use of natural
gas for the manufacture of carbon black from wells within ten miles
of an incorporated town or an industrial plant. The statute accomplished this by prohibiting the use of gas, within the stated tenmile radius, for manufacturing processes in which the heat potential

119. Id. See generally 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§ 204.4, 204.6-.7; Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 Miss. L.J. 1 (1958).
120. 177 U.S. at 199, 211-12.
121. See generally 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§ 204.4, 204.6-.7; Kuntz, supra note
119. There exists some slender precedent under the capture doctrine for entitlement
of owners to ratable shares of production, as suggested in Union Gas & Oil Co. v.
Fyffe, 294 S.W. 176 (Ky. 1927), and to prevent totally preemptive drainage by a neighbor,
Ross v. Damm, 270 N.W. 722 (Mich. 1936), but it was the correlative rights doctrine
that furnished a firm basis for judicial adjustment of rights among owners within
a field. When applied by the courts, the doctrine has been used to prevent gross wasting of extracted oil and gas, the impairment of the productive capacity of the reservoir
as a common source of supply, malicious depletion of the common source of supply
and violation of the right of others to a fair opportunity to produce oil and gas. See
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Manufacturers' Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana
Natural Gas & Oil Co., 57 N.E. 912 (Ind. 1900); Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating
Co., 77 S.W. 368 (Ky. 1903). See generally Kuntz, supra note 119. The doctrine may offer
additional grounds for an action by one landowner against another to recover damages
caused by the negligent waste of oil and gas. See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d
558 (Tex.), on remand, 216 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); 62 HARv. L. REv. 146 (1948);
27 TEXAS L. REv. 349 (1949). See also Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 111
S.W. 374 (Ky. 1908).
122. 254 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920). In the interim the Court had sustained a New
York statute that in effect forbade the pumping of percolating, naturally carbonated
waters for the purpose of extracting and selling the gas, when the de-gassed water
was then wasted. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 77 (1911).
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was not fully and actually used. 123 The statute further forbade any
owner or lessee of a well to sell gas for the manufacture of carbon
black. 124 The carbon black companies had been using massive amounts
of gas in an inefficient process to recover carbon black and types of
gasoline. Although the Court accepted the company's averment that
this use was more remunerative than the prices the gas would have
brought in the area for fuel purposes,1

25

the statute was upheld against

a variety of constitutional objections as legitimately accommodating
coexisting rights by the limitation of one right so that other rights
12
might be enjoyed, and as protecting the interests of the community.
The Court characterized this, and the previously approved Indiana
statute, as valid interpositions of state police power to prevent both
waste and disproportionate use of either gas or oil by one owner. The
Court thus approved the Wyoming statute as a legitimate adjustment
to preserve various rights in the resources of the state.127 The case

involved not only the relative worth of gas as a source of carbon
black versus its value as a fuel source, but also the fact that the carbon
black plant would have exhausted the reservoir in about three years,
while consumption of the gas for fuel purposes would have lasted at
least ten years.128 The legislature thus considered not only present

comparative values but also the desirability of alternative resource uses
over time. The Court in approving this action noted that
necessarily there was presented to the judgment and policy of the
State a comparison of utilities which involved, as well, the preservation of the natural resources of the State, and the equal participation in them by the people of the State. And the duration of this
utility was for the consideration of the State, and we do not think
that the State was required by the Constitution of the United States
to stand idly by while these resources were disproportionately used,
or used in such way that tended to their depletion, having no power
of interference.

29

123. 254 U.S. at 309-10.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 310-11, 323.
126. Id., stating that the case fell within that licit category of state regulation to
prohibit an extravagant, wasteful or disproportionate use of natural gas that had
previously been approved in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900), and
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
127. 254 U.S. at 323-25.
128. Id. at 321. Midland's facilities were built to be portable, raising the spectre
of a peripatetic carbon black company moving about the state, depleting gas fields
as it went.
129. Id. at 324. The Court also acknowledged that the Ohio Oil Co. case had
likewise contained tacit recognition that a state could by statute give preference to
the long term use of natural gas as a heat source over its short term use as an energy
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Interim Note on the Relation of Legal Doctrines to Development
Rights.-A basic purpose of this article is to suggest a system by which

the states can defensibly and confidently do exactly what was done in
these early oil regulation statutes-give valid legal enactment to systems of stated preferences for selected uses of resources over time. The
legislative preference in both cases was for gas to be used as a fuel
source. This use was "preferred" over that of gas as productive energy
for oil extraction in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana and over that of gas for
its carbon black potential in Walls v. Midland Carbon Co.18
When the Indiana and Wyoming legislatures thus preferred one
use value over another in these two instances, they resolved a conflict
between alternative use values that inhered in a single resource. Because of its common-source nature, however, the gas resource under
regulation had the effect of linking separately owned tracts into an
interrelated web of correlative rights. Legislatively preferred resource
uses create somewhat comparable linkages of separate properties in
the case of rights-of-way for transportation uses, 13s of the ponds

necessary for milldam energy uses"' and of the districts necessary to
support the construction of drainage and irrigation facilities.' 8a Legislatures prefer and impose one of two alternative resource uses in other
contexts, for example, when separately owned properties are linked
by a shared externality. 34 In fact, under the analysis suggested by
Professor Sax, webs of externalities inextricably link lands, waters and
their resource values. 3 5 In specialized cases, development may create
source to raise oil, and thus inferentially over the heat potential of the oil thus
raised. Id.
130. Because of the particularized nature of the resource uses pursued by the
Ohio Oil Co. and Midland Carbon Co., the legislative preferment of the fuel value
of the gas resource apparently forced the companies out of the business of using the
gas for their chosen purposes. Thus most of the value of their specialized on-site
production facilities was destroyed. By contrast, the other gas producers were protected
in their extraction of the gas as a fuel resource, and they retained full and perhaps
enhanced use of their production facilities. The legislative preferment of one use
of a common pool resource was thus an inevitable preferment of the established
expectations and investment of one user group over those of another. The preferment
may have been rational, beneficial and economically efficient, but these facts are not
responsive to the question, "Why shouldn't the losers in such situations be compensated?" This problem is explored extensively in Sax I; Michelman, supra note 6, at 11931201, 1236-44; and Sax II, where variations on the issue are raised.
131. See pp. 53-57 supra.
132. See pp. 58-66 supra.
133. See pp. 66-67 supra.
134. The classic example is Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), in which one
farmer's cedar trees, which served as host for but were not harmed by cedar rust,
were ordered destroyed, essentially without compensation, to prevent destruction of
nearby apple orchards from communication of the rust.
135. Sax II at 151-61.
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such grave, widespread external consequences that legislatures may
validly prefer and impose the alternative use of nondevelopment,
without compensation. 8 8 Such forms of onerous regulation might be
characterized and justified as instances of valid legislative preferment
of certain uses, in order to adjust and to protect the correlative but
conflicting rights of numerous owners to avoid or impose externalities.
Viewed in this light, externalities from the particular use of one resource may cause the destruction or waste of both similar and different
resource values in the hands of other owners. The externality web
forms a common pool.
All of this discussion relates to the development rights concept in
two ways. First, the covert effect of zoning is to create a common pool
of development entitlements within a zoning district. All owners within this pool would have roughly correlative entitlement to a fair share
of the pooled development potential. 13 Secondly, at the present time
and within the proposed development districts, preferments of particular land uses would be imposed on various tracts in the form of the
regulation of development density, type and timing. These preferments
would be based both on reallocation of development entitlements from
the zoning pool, and on avoidance of harm to the externality web or
pool. Incommensurable land values would result."8 By use of development rights, however, an adjustment of the inequities in land value
resulting from the imposition of land use preferments could be accomplished.
Despite the approval of these statutes, and the obvious evils of
the rule of capture as an operational policy, more pervasive state
efforts to regulate the production of gas and oil came slowly. There
were, of course, major pressures against any such regulation from
industry, which was perhaps dissatisfied with the situation as it existed
but not certain that regulation would effect a cure. Two major forms
139
of regulation eventuated, however: pooling and unitization.
Pooling seeks systematic prevention of the physical and economic
waste that occurs when each owner drills as many wells and produces as much oil and gas as he wishes. It also protects the correlative rights of landowners over a reservoir. First, based on physical
data, a determination is made of the density of wells necessary to
produce a reservoir fully and efficiently under primary recovery
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 151-61, 167-71; see pp. 41-44 supra.
See pp. 39-41 supra.
See pp. 39-46, 48-50 supra.
See generally I R. MYERS §§ 1.02, 8.01,
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methods. It may be determined, for instance, that one well in the
center of each 160-acre quarter section would adequately and wisely
produce the reservoir. Each such 160-acre tract is often referred to as
a drilling unit, and in modern practice the reservoir would be divided
into drilling units by the state oil and gas regulatory authority,
ordinarily following government survey lines. Normally, one well is
permitted near the center of each drilling unit. If A owns 320 acres,
he may find that his land has been divided into two 160-acre units,
each entitled to one well. If A, B, C and D each own contiguous 40acre quarter-quarters, they may find that their land has been blocked
into one 160-acre drilling unit, entitled to be developed by only one
well. 14 0
Controlling the number and spacing of wells, however, is only
part of the process. Further control must be exercised over the rate of
production so that each drilling unit, and thus the entire field, produces at a controlled rate. 14 1 This rate should serve the multiple objectives of maximum recovery of resources under primary recovery
operations, protection of the correlative and peculiar rights of owners
under a variety of criteria, and production of that field's share of larger
production quotas established by state and federal production regulation structures. These various objectives persistently tend toward mutual inconsistency but are nonetheless brought into some rough accord so that each drilling unit is given an allowable rate of production (an "allowable") .142 This system is also referred to as proration140. Id. See generally 5 W. SuMMERs, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 951 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as W. SUMMERS]; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§ 902-07, 923-24. The
basic structure was approved in Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376
(1939).
Interestingly, from a development rights perspective, the first pooling acts were
municipal ordinances, passed and upheld as exercises of the zoning power, by which
municipalities sought to confine oil and gas wells to a density of one per city block,
or less. See Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F.2d 541 (D. Kan. 1928), afl'd, 32 F.2d 134 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 573 (1929). The Oxford ordinance required that all lot
owners within the block be allowed to participate in the proceeds of production on a
ratable basis, and in direct effect made the right to develop oil and gas a transferable
development right within a market place defined as one city block. 24 F.2d at 544.
The ordinances were held valid as a legal curbing of nuisances, 24 F.2d at 546-47; 32
F.2d at 139-40, and as adjusting and protecting correlative rights. 24 F.2d at 548-49,
32 F.2d at 140. See also Adkins v. City of West Frankfort, 51 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. Ill.
1943) (ordinance generally upheld, but invalidated because of provision imposing absolute liability on operator regardless of legal liability for any harm caused); Tysco
Oil Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 12 F. Supp. 195 (S.D. Tex. 1935); Sovereign Oil Corp. v.
Fenton, 114 P.2d 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941); Thompson v. Johnson-Kemnitz Drilling Co.,
145 P.2d 422 (Okla. 1943).
141. See generally 5 W. SuMaERs § 951; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§ 902-07,
923, 925.
142. See generally IR. MYERS §§ 1,01(6)-(7); 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§ 970; 7 id.
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ing, with each well being awarded a prorated share of field-wide production.
Unitization refers to the operation of the entire reservoir, or a
major part of it, as an entity, without regard to patterns of surface
ownership. Certain types of highly beneficial operations virtually
require unitization. For instance, it is possible to maintain pressures
within a producing stratum by reinjecting gas that is brought to the
surface in the production of oil. 14 3 Costs and expectable returns are

such, however, that typically no single owner would undertake this
activity unless his neighbors did likewise or agreed to cooperate in
the project in some manner. Otherwise, substantial portions of the
owner's reinjection costs would inure to his neighbors' benefit (another instance of the free-rider situation). 4 4 Again, once primary recovery has been exhausted, it may be economically feasible to inject
water along a line of wells and to establish a water flood driving oil
14-16, 474-75; Comment, Proration in Texas: Conservation or Confiscation?, 11 Sw. L.J.
186 (1957). The simplest method to allocate production among various tracts is one
based upon surface acreage. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Welborn, 62 So. 2d 211
(Miss. 1953), and statutes reviewed therein. This formula is perhaps too simple to reflect accurately the variations in richness and recoverability of oil and gas deposits
over a field. Frequently, therefore, complex formulae are used in an attempt to
reflect two or more factors. In Woody v. State Corporation Comm'n, 265 P.2d 1102
(Okla. 1954), the court upheld a formula that allocated 50% of production on a peracreage basis, and 50% of production on the basis of the saturated hydrocarbon pore
space underlying various tracts. Obviously the allocation might have been made on
a 60/40 or even 90/10 basis. Where all tracts have previously been developed, allocation may be based on records of prior production. Commissioner v. Belridge Oil Co., 27
T.C. 1044, aff'd, 267 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1959). There are some reported instances of
formulae that are designed to change after a certain amount of production has been
obtained, so that some parties receive a larger share of early production (e.g., first one
million barrels), and a smaller share thereafter, see, e.g., Kingwood Oil Co. v. Bell,
244 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1957). Extremely imaginative approaches to such formulae are
often taken when either pooling or unitization is being accomplished by private contract between several producers. State regulatory agencies may have some latitude
to use multiple factors in formulae, see, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Welborn, 62 So. 2d
211 (Miss. 1953); Woody v. State Corporation Comm'n, supra, but agency orders must
finally mesh with the general and specific statutory criteria under which the agencies
operate. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 373 P.2d 809 (N.M.
1962) (agency order invalid as lacking factual base required by statute). For a discussion of the possibility of allocating development rights using complex formulae
such as the ones discussed here, see pp. 100-01 infra.
143. This process, known as "recycling," is described in 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS
§ 104. Water produced from wells may also be recycled. Id.
144. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 284 P.2d 242
(Colo. 1955), in which the Colorado regulatory agency, not having power to order
unitization, apparently sought to force it nonetheless by ordering that gas produced
with the oil from a particular reservoir must be returned to the reservoir and in effect
must be recycled. The order was stricken down as ultra vires, but unitization would undoubtedly have followed had it been upheld.
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before it across the reservoir for recovery at distant wells. Unless the
reservoir is operated as a unit, water flooding may be done only piecemeal and under considerable handicap. At worst, owners of injection
wells may get little return over the expenses of injection, and nonparticipating neighbors may reap an undeserved bonanza of oil flushed
onto their properties by the water flood. 45 Often under such circumstances secondary recovery will not take place. In addition to the use
of unitization to facilitate secondary recovery, primary recovery may
often be optimized if the reservoir is unitized.
Either pooling or unitization on a limited basis may be effected
by contract among private individuals. It is strong testimony to the
efficiency of these devices that they have been arranged by private
contract in the face of seemingly overwhelming practical and legal
6
impediments."4
Following the particularized regulation reflected in the Indiana and
Wyoming cases, the modern era of regulation began in 1919 when the
Railroad Commission of Texas, that state's oil and gas conservation
agency, promulgated its rule 37, requiring the spacing of wells at
minimum intervals of 300 feet and no closer than 150 feet to property
lines. This was upheld as a reasonable exercise of the police power
to prevent unnecessary fire hazards and waste. 1 47 In other states, con145. For examples of secondary recovery operations pursued without unitization,
see Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963), and Railroad Commn
v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962). Such situations arise when owners of sufficient

tracts decide to pursue secondary recovery operations within their extensive landholdings, operating some of their wells for injection and some for recovery. For a
description of difficulties that holdouts caused to an attempted unitization program,
see Prutzman, Fletcher, Miller, Cage, Keith & Winn, Chronicle of Creating a Fieldwide
Unit, in SOUTH-WESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, FIFTH NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PETROLEUM
LANDMEN 77, 126-27 (1964), cited in 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS § 910, at 88-89. See
generally 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§ 901, 905, 912.
146. The potential benefit of such operations is illustrated in Western Gulf Oil

Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 206 P.2d 944, 946 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949), in which it was estimated
that recycling would yield 61 million barrels

(valued at more than $166 million) more

than could be expected from conventional production. Despite this fact, defendants in
that action successfully resisted plaintiff's efforts to coerce them into the recycling activities by litigation, there being no compulsory unitization statute available. Id. at 952.
Cases such as the above illustrate the difficulties of achieving voluntary unitization,
even when it seems an act of financial insanity to resist it, although the possibility of
exorbitant

exactions

by nonparticipating

holdout

owners always

lurks

in

the back-

ground of such cases. Despite such difficulties, the major treatises recount numerous
examples of voluntary unitization and give samples of the legal documents by which
such agreements are governed. See generally I R. MYES §§ 2.06, 3.01, 4, 6.01, 8.02; 5 W.
SUMMERS §§ 952-53, 955-72; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§ 904, 910-11, 921, 938.
147. Railroad Comm'n rule 37, November 26, 1919, as amended, was upheld in
Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, rehearing denied, 87 S.W.2d 1069
(Tex. 1935). For a summary history of the rule, see Hardwicke, Oil-Well Spacing Regulations & Protection of Property Rights in Texas, 31 TEXAs L. REv. 99 (1952). The rule
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servation agencies were granted authority to subdivide a field into
drilling units, representing the maximum area that could be drained
economically and efficiently by one well. The result was that when
several owners held land within one unit, their interests were pooled.
One received permission to drill and the others participated in the
profits or losses. This system has been consistently approved by the
courts as violating neither the contractual nor fourteenth amend14
ment rights of the complaining owner.

Prorationing has likewise been upheld. Under California regulations, for instance, prorationing took the form of controlling the
gas-to-oil ratio permitted during production. As in the Indiana case,
one way to get the lion's share of oil was to produce extremely rapidly,
using a disproportionate amount of gas to bring the oil to the surface
and also to produce a low pressure point towards which oil and gas
would migrate from the properties of neighbors. Control of the production ratio of gas-to-oil was a practical way to curb this practice,
and with it the waste of gas or reservoir energy of underground oil
trapped in place by avoidable pressure differentials, and to curb the disproportionate production of one owner over others. Regulation of the
gas-to-oil ratio was approved by the Supreme Court as a valid form of
rights and the
police power regulation to protect both correlative
149
interests of the public that resources not be wasted.

Marketplace and competitive realities soon dictated more sophisticated forms of control. In the early days of oil production, a tremendous competitive edge was enjoyed in Oklahoma by oil companies
with integrated operations in which their wells connected directly to
50
oil pipelines and to refineries.1 Integrated operators produced at a

rapid pace into their pipelines, and although using all of the oil and
gas they produced, they were causing waste of reservoir energy and
151
of the full amount of oil recoverable by primary recovery. In addi1 52
tion, they had virtually preempted the local market. In order to produce any fair share of oil, non-integrated operators were forced to
pump and then store oil in large earthen reservoirs, awaiting transporhas spawned much litigation and commentary. See generally H.

WILLIAMS,

R.

MAXWELL

& C. MEYERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 640-82 (1964).

148. See Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Isaacson, 255 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1958);
Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83 (Okla. 1938), appeal dismissed, 305 U.S.
376 (1939). For compendious listings of the state statutes and discussions of their impact,
see 1 R. MYERS §§ 6.01, 8.01; 5 W. SUMMERS §§ 1000-51; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§
905.1-.2, 934.
149. See Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8, 21-22 (1931).
150. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 US. 210, 226-28 (1932).
151. Id. at 233.
152. Id. at 226-30.
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tation by truck or other limited means. Leakage, spoilage and fires
resulted. 153 Responding to this situation, the Oklahoma Legislature
passed a statute prohibiting petroleum "waste," defined, in addition
to its ordinary meanings, to include economic, underground and surface waste, and waste incident to production in excess of transportation or marketing facilities or reasonable market demand. This statute
further provided that when full production from a reservoir could
be had only under circumstances constituting waste as statutorily defined, production would be reduced. Under limited production situations, each producer could take only that proportion of the limited
quantity of production possible, without causing waste, as his share
of full production bore to full production throughout the reservoir.5
To illustrate, assume that full reservoir production is 1,000 barrels
per day, and A's well operating at full production will produce 500
barrels per day, or 50 percent of reservoir full production. Assume
further that the rate of reservoir production possible without waste
(within market demand) is only 600 barrels per day. A's well's proportionate share of the permissible production would then be reduced
to 300 barrels per day, 50 percent of permitted production. Noting
that the statute and administrative order being reviewed did not involve price fixing or interference with interstate commerce, 15 5 the Supreme Court upheld this market-demand prorationing as reasonable
to protect correlative rights and to prevent waste.' 5
The body of precedent that developed around pooling practices
is also regarded as essentially approving the basic readjustments
of rights caused by unitization. Unitization was long advocated by
some persons inside and many persons outside the industry as a highly
desirable, if not indispensable, form of regulation. But it also met
with considerable resistance. In the 1930's and 1940's, experiments
with unitization by private contract were attempted.157 The first compulsory unitization statute was enacted in Oklahoma in 1945 and was
later upheld in the courts. 5 8 Others followed this lead, with 25 states
153. Id.
154. Id. at 223-26; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 273 (1969).
155. 286 U.S. at 232-35; see Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
156. 286 U.S. at 233-34. Other Supreme Court decisions further expanded the scope
of regulations for gas and oil allocation. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940); Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1942), appeal
dismissed, 320 U.S. 222 (1943). But cf. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Co.,
300 U.S. 55 (1937).
157. See generally 1 R. MYERS §§ 1.02, 8.01, 8.02.
158. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 286.1-.17 (1969). The law's validity was upheld
in Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 231 P.2d 997 (Okla. 1951), appeal dismissed sub nor. Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 343 U.S. 390 (1952).
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enacting permissive unitization statutes (to avoid state anti-trust
problems) and 19 states enacting compulsory unitization statutes.15 9
Statutes enabling compulsory pooling and those enabling compulsory unitization operate in comparable manner. Compulsory pooling
statutes typically presuppose the existence of drilling or spacing units
and explicitly permit voluntary pooling. If voluntary pooling does
not occur, owners of interests in lands or in some cases the state regulatory agency may initiate proceedings for compulsory pooling.
Typically, a petition is filed that may contain information on the
proposed tract, the proposed locations of the well, an enumeration of
the owners of all interests, the reasons necessitating pooling, proposed
methods for bearing costs and the proposed apportionment of production. Notice is then given to all affected owners, an administrative
hearing is held and a pooling order issued. Only one well will be
drilled on the unit, despite the fact that many parties may have
an interest in the unit, and the unit driller or "operator" is usually
designated in the order, with other parties losing the right to drill on
their own land. The fundamental aim is that each owner receive his
just and equitable share of production. 16 0 Major variations exist among
the states with respect to the rights of those interest owners who do
not wish to pay their ratable costs of drilling a well on the unit. If a
dry well is drilled, some statutes immunize nonparticipating owners
from any assessment for its costs. 161 If a producing well comes in, some
statutes allow owners who have previously refused to make contributions to the speculative well-drilling effort, to participate in the production of the well upon payment of a penalty fee to those who initial162
ly bore the costs of successful drilling.
Compulsory unitization statutes likewise provide for initiation of
proceedings by interested parties and occasionally by the regulatory
agency. After filing of the petition, which contains information very
159. For compilations of state statutes, see 1 R. MYERS §§ 6.01-.07, 8.02; 2 id. §§
15.11-.17; 5 W. SUMMERS §§ 1000-51, 1053 (the last section contains excerpts from a
useful report describing the implementation and frequency of use of the statutes in
various states, based upon reports issued by state governors in the mid-1960's); 6 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§ 911-12, 934.
160. See generally 1 R. MYERS §§ 8.01, 9; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§ 905, 940-48.
161. The problem of the non-contributing co-owner may be caused by the coowner's financial inability to contribute his share, or a financially able co-owner may
for a variety of reasons prefer that his fellow owners use their money and none of
his in what he may regard as a speculative drilling venture. Typical statutes that
immunize a non-contributing co-owner from a ratable share of the expenses of drilling
a dry well provide that the ratable share of his expense may only be deducted from
production actually achieved by a well. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100-6-4 (1963).
Similar state statutes are cited in 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS § 905.2.
162. See 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS § 905.2; pp 92-93 infra.
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similar to that contained in petitions for pooling, notice is given to all
owners of interests in the lands involved and a hearing is held. As a
'result of the hearing, and before an order may be issued, the agency
must find that unitization is necessary to effectuate the statutory purposes, that unitized operations are physically feasible, that these operations will yield more return than their costs, that they are for the
common good within the affected area and that fair and equitable
provisions will be made to protect the various ownership interests in
'the unit. In contrast to pooling orders, unitization orders must often
be approved by a high percentage (two-thirds or more) of various categories of interest holders within a stated period after the entry of the
order; without such ratification the order fails. The order must, of
course, cover a common source of supply and it typically contains
or adverts to a detailed plan of unitized operations that includes the
method by which costs and production are to be allocated. 1 3
Dissident owners whose interests have been compulsorily pooled
or unitized are subjected to an extreme abridgment of property rights.
:Of course, only the oil and gas right is affected. This is a discrete and
severable right, however, as development rights would be under the
proposed scheme. Moreover, if oil and gas development is at least
moderately profitable, this incident may be the predominately valuable attribute of the land, perhaps worth much more than the entire
balance of the fee interest.16 4 The right to develop oil and gas is taken
from the property owner and granted to the pool operator or to the
committee charged with operating a unitized field. The development
right is thus typically placed in the hands of others and is communitized. 165 The owner's property interest in oil and gas under his land and
163. See generally 1 R. MYERS §§ 8.02, 9; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§ 912-13,
940-48.
164. See note 146 supra; 39 CAN. B. REv. 275, 282-83 (1961), discussing litigation
over a quarter section of Canadian land that overlay $5,000,000 of oil and gas. Devotees
of The Beverly Hillbillies will need no substantiating citations.
165. To this point there has been no discussion of the formidable complexity into
which the ownership interests in oil and gas are customarily subdivided, but now there
will be limited discussion in order to clarify the text. Typically, a property owner
does not himself develop oil and gas, but leases the minerals to an operator for development. The customary lease is for a primary term of a few years, with a provision for
indefinite extension as long as oil and gas production may last. Most leases contain
various provisions to prod the lessee (often called the "operator") to explore for and
develop the oil and gas. The lease usually provides that the owner will receive a royalty
of one-eighth of all oil and gas produced, free and clear of production costs, which the
lessee bears. See generally 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS § 202. Prior to granting a lease, the
landowner does not ordinarily expect to undertake actual physical development of the
oil and gas but does expect to determine when and if these resources will be developed,
who the lessee will be and what provisions the lease will contain. These latter expectations are the ones that may be very substantially affected by pooling or unitization.
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his ability to seek its capture have, in fact, been converted into fractional interests ultimately expressed in the dollars-and-cents costs and
profits of operations conducted by others. The decisions of the operators
must, of course, conform to the specific charges contained in the orders
under which pooled or unitized operations are carried out, and the
166
decisions are appealable by dissatisfied owners.
Although the individual owner may participate in the expenses and
profits of development, the terms and timing may be quite onerous to
particular owners. If, for instance, an owner of a pooled interest is
not able to raise the necessary capital to participate in the costs of
drilling, he may be relegated to the peculiar status of being his own
lessor. He then receives the customary one-eighth royalty from the
production attributable to his interest, and the operator of the pooled
unit receives the conventional lessee's seven-eighths of production, subject to costs of production.8 7 Again the pooled owner may find that
an existing oil and gas lease on his property has been extended indefinitely, even in the face of nearly total inaction by his lessee, if the
operator of the pool brings in a producing well on a pooled unit
covering even a miniscule fraction of the owner's land. 8 An owner
within an area of unitized operations may be required to surrender
his wells to the unit, taking credit for their value. But if his wells are
Assume that lands owned by A, B and C, are included within a pooled unit, that A
has leased his oil and gas to AL (lessee of A), that B had leased to BL and that C has
not leased his lands. Assume that AL has been designated unit operator and expects
to begin development promptly. A very sketchy delineation of the impact on the rights
of the parties would be the following: A's lessee continues as operator, but under
duty to conduct operations with the interests of all parties in mind. 6 H. WILLIAMS
& C. MEYERS §§ 990-92. B and BL are relegated to the sidelines, with some limited
voice in, and the ability to seek review of, administrative orders and the operating
decisions made by AL. Id. §§ 941, 946, 948, 950-57, 976, 990-92. C, presently without
a lessee, might become an operator by contributing to well-drilling costs, but if he
does not wish to do this, he may be forced to become a lessor of AL. See Anderson v.
Corporation Comm'n, 327 P.2d 699 (Okla. 1957). He otherwise enjoys the same limited
decision-making and the appeal rights as B and BL.
Unitization frequently involves many tracts and consequently causes the extreme
diminution of an owner's control over his resources. Although his right to seek review
is preserved, he has become only one among many owners who participate in the development decisions that are eventually made. See generally 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS
§§ 948, 976. A significant exception exists if the statute being used is the type that
allows dissident owners to avoid participating in a unitization program for the lands
that surround them. In this case, the rights of the non-unitized holdouts must be
protected, often with considerable reduction in the total effectiveness of the unitization
plan. Id. §§ 934, 937. Further, not all states have compulsory unitization statutes,
Texas being a notable example.
166. See note 165 supra.
167. Anderson v. Corporation Comm'n, 327 P.2d 699 (Okla. 1957).
168. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Isaacson, 255 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1958); Clovis
v. Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp., 345 P.2d 729 (Colo. 1959).
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producing from two or more strata, the unit proprietors may choose
to shut down production from non-unitized strata without paying any
compensation. 169 Formulae for the distribution of production proceeds
vary greatly and are typically based on multiple criteria that are highly
judgemental, both individually and in their interactive effects.
Examples of such criteria are allocation on the basis of surface acreage
ownership, allocation on the basis of the number of wells in place or
allowed to produce and allocation that reflects the varying richness of
the deposits beneath various surface landholdings underlying a common pool. 70 These examples scarcely begin to catalogue the results
that may occur from pooling and unitization.'17 The fundamental
reality is that someone other than the owner makes the basic decisions about the development of a highly and sometimes preeminently valuable resource of the owner's land.
Results such as those mentioned above are frequently produced and
judicially condoned by widely used systems of police power regulation
of oil and gas production. Much of the basic structure of the regulatory
systems, the thrust and validity of the public purposes they might serve
and the degree of impact they might inflict on the rights of regulated
property owners were approved by the United States Supreme Court.
The statutes reviewed by these decisions were generated by notoriously
chaotic and immensely destructive situations that arose within the oil
and gas industry.1 2 The realities of these situations and the potential
enormity of the resulting resource destruction were not at all lost
on the courts. The shift to the correlative-rights doctrine as a conceptual justification for the control of oil and gas production was an
almost inevitable result of the pernicious consequences arising under
the doctrine of capture. The shift also eased vexatious constitutional
questions. Public interest of utmost gravity was involved in the prevention of the massive, multiple wastes and of the destruction of valuable, nonrenewable resources. It is possible, in fact, that public in169. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 193 F.2d 818
(10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 920 (1952). It is not uncommon for several oil-rich
strata to exist at varying depths underneath a tract, like the layers of frosting in a
layer cake. A well may then be completed to produce from two or more strata simultaneously. If only one stratum is unitized, the well owner may wish to continue production from the non-unitized stratum that is also being tapped by his well. Permission to do so was denied in the principal case, and the unit operators were allowed
to close down production from the non-unitized stratum.
170. See, e.g., Jones Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 382 P.2d 751 (Okla.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963); Chenoweth v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 382 P.2d
743 (Okla. 1963); note 142 supra.
171. For an exhaustive analysis of myriad further consequences, see 1 R. MYERS §§
10, 13, 14; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS §§ 950-64, 980-84.
172. See generally notes 109-12 supra.
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terest alone would have sufficed to justify the regulations in the eyes
of the courts, without the admixture of the correlative-rights
analysis.l1s In any event, the urgent necessity for these regulations
173. An alternative proposition is that most of the oil and gas regulations
examined might have been sustained solely on the basis that they protected correlative
rights, without the admixture of the public interest justification. Either proposition
elicits the same response-it is difficult to delineate the fracture line between protecting
correlative rights and protecting broader public interests. To the extent that distinct
"public interest" components exist in the oil and gas regulatory systems examined, they
often seem to consist of an extension of policies that give generalized protection to
correlative rights. If this be so, it may be traced to the process by which correlative
rights are defined.
The doctrine of correlative rights has no inherent normative content. Until some
benchmarks of permissible resource use or individual entitlement are supplied, the
lowest common denominator of individual greed seems a perfectly appropriate operative norm. Once this standard is rejected as unsatisfactory, however, it is difficult to
imagine any substitute norm that is not conducive toward long-term public interests,
if these are defined in terms of resource conservation. "Public interest" itself must of
course be fleshed in with substantive content, not an inconsiderable problem.
One authority has suggested:
[T]he correlative rights of owners in a common source of [oil and gas] supply
include: (1) the right against waste of extracted substances, (2) the right against
spoilage of the common source of supply, (3) the right against malicious depletion of the common source of supply, (4) the right to a fair opportunity to
extract oil or gas.
Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 Miss. L.J. 1, 2 (1958).
The standards are incomplete, however. They lack any solid referents in terms of
acceptable uses, production processes and consumptive rates for the common resource.
These referents must be supplied by the courts, the legislature or perhaps by consensus among the owners involved. The referents, in the form of standards or rules,
will then comprise the substantive content of the correlative rights of the owners.
However supplied, and whatever their substantive content, the rules governing the
exercise of correlative rights inevitably have a highly contextual aura about them. The
context from which they derive and to which they must apply is that of numerous
owners exercising rights in a resource. The owners in a sense constitute a minipublic. Specific regulation of their exercise of correlative rights is thus pro tanto
"public" in its focus from the outset and simply cannot be shorn of this "public" content. Thus between regulations to adjust correlative rights and regulations that safeguard general "public" interest, there is a troublesome blurring of a commonly shared
thrust toward resources conservation.
At the extreme ends of the regulatory spectrum, public interest and correlative
rights may be in sharp conflict. Permitting the exercise of correlative rights by "flush"
production would violate any public policies of resource conservation, whereas regulations
to preserve the resource by forbidding its production would "adjust" correlative rights
only in the sense of denying their exercise. Short of such extremes, it is clear that regulations frequently constrain the exercise of correlative rights much further than the
owners would have done on a purely consensual basis. Also, some regulations are
characterized by a special sensitivity toward correlative rights, as in Champlin Ref.
Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932). In that case, a simple prohibition
against earthen storage and oil spillage would have prevented the major waste involved, but with considerable violence to the correlative rights of the nonpipelining
operators, who would have subsequently been closed. Despite such instances, however,
in the middle ground of moderate production regulation it seems that the furtherance
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clearly gave them strong momentum toward favorable review in the
early Supreme Court cases. It is assertible that this momentum and
the strength of the early decisions remain operative as a background

reality in the judicial review of oil and gas conservation legislation to
this day. This is not to say, however, that agency actions will not be
promptly overturned if in excess of the statutory base of authority
or that statutes unsuited to the service of legitimate conservation ends
174
will not be stricken by the courts.
Coupled with this momentum, as a reality of the judicial review
process, is the complexity of the regulatory proceedings under review.
Statutory policies are often individually meritorious and mutually
inconsistent. 1 75 Regulation is accomplished after extended hearing

processes. The property interests regulated are typically subdivided
with as much complexity as is anywhere known under our system of

laws. 17 1 The physical processes of oil and gas production being regulated are often obscure, highly debatable and intensely controversial." ,
Given these pragmatic considerations, it is typical for courts to approve regulations that are patently less than perfect but that have been
issued as a result of the informed best judgment of the regulatory
agencies. 17 This situation is similar to that existing in the delineation
of public interests and the generalized adjustment of correlative rights often tend to
coincide considerably.
It is our thesis, of course, that the use of development rights would in comparable
manner tend simultaneously toward the adjustment of correlative rights, which assertibly exist within, but are unaccounted for by, our present zoning system, and
toward the furtherance of broad public interests in land use. See pp. 84-85 supra; pp.
104-06 infra.
174. See, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 (1937) (statute not
in furtherance of conservation interests or correlative rights); Continental Oil Co. v.
Oil Conservation Comm'n, 373 P.2d 809 (N.M. 1962) (agency order invalid as lacking
factual base required by statute). See generally 6 H. WiLLAms & C. MEYERS § 948.
175. For discussion of tension and overlap between the protection of correlative
rights and the furtherance of conservation interests, see note 174 supra.
176. See note 165 supra.
177. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940).
The Supreme Court there observed:
The record is redolent with familiar dogmatic assertions by experts equally confident of contradictory contentions. These touch matters of geography and geology
and physics and engineering. No less is there conflict in the evidence as to the
solidity of respondent's apprehension that there will be drainage of the oil beneath its surface by neighboring wells. The Commission's experts insist that threat,
if existent at all, is speculative, and that the Commission's power of continuous
oversight is readily available for relief if real danger should arise in the future.
Plainly these are not issues for our arbitrament.
Id. at 583.
178. The Supreme Court has stated:
The state was confronted with its general problem of proration and with
the special relation to it of the small tracts in the particular configuration of the
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and assessment processes relating to drainage and irrigation districts
noted earlier. 1 9
Summary of the Relation of Legal Doctrines to Development
Rights.-Precedents provided by oil and gas regulation mesh well with
much of the doctrinal base necessary to provide legal justification for
development rights. The common pool of an oil and gas reservoir is
quite analogous to the common pool of development potential that
already exists covertly within present zoning practices and that should
be overtly institutionalized by using development rights within
planning districts. It is true that present practices within the zoning
pool of development potential may not be comparable to the ability
of the Ohio Oil Company or the Midland Carbon Company to effect
unilateral seizure of a grossly disproportionate share of resources at
immediate prejudice to fellow owners and to the resource itself. s0 As
noted, however, highly disproportionate treatment is accorded various
owners within a zoning pool."", Some are relegated to extremely lowvalue land uses, while a few are zoned for extremely high value use.
And note that these gross inequities result from the acts of the government itself. They are the inadvertant and collateral, but presently inevitable, results of our police power regulation of land use. By contrast, the Indiana and Wyoming cases dealt with disproportionate use
resulting solely from individual rapacity. Certainly it must be as
permissible for the government to redress disproportionate entitlements resulting inadvertently from its own regulatory acts, as it is
for the government to redress disproportions caused by individual rapacity. This is precisely what would be possible by the use of development rights.
The prevention of waste was a major justification of oil and gas
regulations. It may seem that present land development practices,
which could be controlled by the development rights approach, do
not generate the intense, obvious levels of waste that early oil and
gas production practices generated. Land development practices do,
East Texas field. It has chosen to meet these problems through the day-to-day
exertions of a body specially entrusted with the task because presumably competent to deal with it. In striking the balances that have to be struck with the
complicated and sutble factors that must enter into such judgments, the Commission has observed established procedure. If the history of proration is any guide, the
present order is but one more item in a continuous series of adjustments. It is
not for the federal courts to supplant the Commission's judgment even in the
face of convincing proof that a different result would have been better.
Id. at 585-84.
179. See discussion and authorities cited at notes 87-96 and accompanying text
supra.
180. See notes 110-29 and accompanying text supra.
181. See pp. 35-53 supra.
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however, cause widespread waste with grave short- and long-term societal consequences. Development in areas of natural hazards, development of land that has high alternative values, the total amount
of land consumed by development, premature development, development out of phase with provision of services and many more examples
might be cited. These are categories of massive, ubiquitous waste that
occur despite the present systems of landuse regulation. They would
all be directly amenable to much more effective, purposive control
under a development rights system than they are at present. Indeed,
the use of development rights may be the best, if not the only, way
to effect simultaneous control of these numerous, major, interrelated
problems. A case can fairly be made, then, that waste-prevention ends
served by a development rights system are not at all incommensurate
with those served by the oil and gas regulatory structures we have discussed.
The impact of a development rights system on landowners is
comparable to, and may in some senses be considerably less than, the
impact under compulsory pooling and unitization. When oil and gas
occur in any particular abundance, they may be the preeminent
monetary attribute of land value. 82 Pooling implies the strong likelihood, and unitization the near certainty, that the development decision and its execution will be stripped from the owner by administrative process, albeit with rights to appeal both the administrative decision and its implementation. And we have seen situations as extreme
as that where a nonparticipating owner on a drilling unit is reduced
to being his own lessor, that is, to receiving a one-eighth royalty of
his own minerals, while the administratively appointed lessee receives
the other seven-eighths.8 3 By contrast, the use of development rights
should alleviate the more confiscatory aspects of present zoning
practices, would leave the development and sale-of-rights decision
in the owner's hands, and could well result in greater total profit from
development in the typical planning district.
Finally it should be noted that each of the categories discussed
above (protection of correlative rights, prevention of waste, furtherance of proper resource development) may by itself serve as a proper
basis for regulation. In the case of development rights, as in the case
of oil and gas regulation, however, the justifications for regulation
are not isolated and unrelated. Rather, the various purposes coincide
powerfully to form an extremely strong, multiple justification for the

182.
183.

See notes 146 & 167 supra.
See pp. 92-93 supra.

1974)

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

proposed regulatory structure.

IV. A

FURTHER LOOK AT DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

Initially we set out the theories and events that are prompting
serious consideration of the creation of severable development rights,
and of marketplaces for such rights within defined development districts. 8 4 Next we took a brief excursion through major areas of legal
precedent that might be mustered to support such a system. 8 5 It is now

time to consider in greater detail how a development rights system
might be structured, and whether it seriously can be asserted that
such a system could survive judicial review.
Our earlier discussion stopped after development rights had been
hypothetically delineated, 186 and residential rights allocated throughout
a district on a per-acre basis. It should be noted that the delineation
of development districts is based on a mixture of natural factors (drainage ways and natural hazard areas, for example) and planning considerations (transportation links and marketing areas of established commercial centers, for example). The delineation of districts is thus a
judgmental process in which the realities of resource use are combined
with a variety of other criteria. Courts have approved similar processes
in defining other types of districts, such as drainage and irrigation
districts and oil and gas spacing units and unitized fields. It seems a
fair conclusion that the process for delineating planning districts
would also receive judicial approval as founded on rational, defensible
planning criteria and natural factors.
Turning now to a more detailed analysis of the development rights
structure within a district, it is again worth noting that under the system as it was described earlier,'

7

zoning and planning would con-

tinue in effect, albeit enhanced by some of the new techniques for
analyzing natural amenability for development. Assume that a very
6implified district is composed of three tracts of 100 acres each, owned
by A, B and C, and that planning and zoning lead to a determination
that A's tract should support no more than 25 residential units, B's
should support 100 units, and C's 175 units. With permissible density
thus determined by planning and zoning processes, the question then
becomes one of allocating transferable development rights to each property owner. As previously noted, the question of permitted density
is distinct and separate from the question of allocating development
184.
185.
186.
187.

See pp. 39-47 supra.
See note 171 supra.
See pp. 52-53 supra.
Id.
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rights. In fact, it is this further process of allocating development
rights independent of permitted density that eliminates the great inequities in the current practice of zoning. Under the allocation of
rights, each owner receives a ratable share in the district's total development potential, whether or not he may fully use that share on his own
property. Various formulae could be used as a basis for this allocation:
FORMULA I.-The decision could be made to allocate
total development rights evenly over the district on a simple
per-acreage basis. Using the hypothetical, 300 dwelling units
may be placed on the 300 acres owned by A, B and C, although
the permitted densities vary among their tracts. If the 300 units
were converted into 300 development rights and allocated on a
per-acre basis, this would be the result:
Allowed
Density
in Number
of Units

Owner

Acres

Development
Rights

A

100

100

25

holds 75 unusable or
surplus rights

B

100

100

100

holds rights necessary
for allowable
development density

C

100

100

175

75 rights short of
number needed to
meet allowable
density

Total

300

300

300

Comments

After the allocation of rights, the owners are free to do as they
wish. A may develop at any density up to 25 units and sell his surplus
rights, he may elect to sell all 100 rights and forego development unless
he later buys more rights or he may elect to retain all 100 rights although he can use only 25. B and C have similar choices. If C wishes
to develop to the permitted density of 175 units, he must purchase
additional rights. In practice, of course, there would be many rights
in the hands of many owners and a ready market for them.
FORMULA H.-It might be decided that a simple peracre basis of allocation is inequitable. For instance, if A's 100
acres are largely swamp, he has perhaps never had develop-
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ment expectations comparable to those of C, who owns 100
acres of land that are well-suited to development. It might then
be decided that this situation should be reflected in the allocation of the 300 development rights. It could be decided to
allocate 70%/ of the rights (70% x 300 = 210 rights) on the
basis of acreage and 30% of the rights (30% x 300 = 90 rights)
on the basis of amenability of land to development. Many
possible procedures might be used to divide these 90 rights
among A, B and C. For instance, assume that on a one-to-ten
scale, A's land was ranked two (low) in terms of development
amenability, B's land was ranked five (amenable) and C's land
eight (highly amenable). The ratings could then be added
(2 + 5 + 8 = 15) to produce the denominator of a fraction
over which would be placed each individual rating: A, 2/15
(weighted share) x 90 (available rights keyed to amenability) =
12 rights; B, 5/15 x 90 = 30 rights; C, 8/15 x 90 - 48 rights.
Many other processes and formulae might yield different, more
agreeable results, but this one serves for illustration. Allocation
of all 300 rights would occur as follows using this approach:
Amenability
Development
Rights
(90
rights)

General
Development
(210
rights)

Total
Development
Rights

Allowed
Density

Comments

Owner

Acres

A

100

70

12

82

25

holds 57
surplus
rights

B

100

70

30

100

100

holds
sufficient
rights

C

100

70

48

118

175

needs 57
additional rights

Total

300

210

300

300

+

90

=

(This formula would work equally well if, for example, harm to
resource functions or impact on the externality web was the criterion
applied.)
The impact of amenability as a factor in the rights-allocation process could be altered by allowing it to operate on more or less than
30 percent of the available rights. Various other factors could
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be introduced into allocation computations by applying similar
formulae to percentage blocs of rights; the comparative equities of
owners thus could be adequately reflected. Rather sophisticated computations of this sort have been a common and judicially approved
practice in computing oil and gas allowables and in apportioning production among numerous individual tracts in unitized oil fields. 8 8
Rights might also be time-phased. There could be classes of rights
that would be usable presently, or in five, ten or fifteen years. Assuming that various areas within the district were scheduled for time
phased development at comparable time intervals, 8 9 manipulation of
the allocation of timed rights could have interesting consequences.
If property owners whose lands were scheduled for belated development were allocated a relatively sizeable share of early maturing rights,
they could sell these and receive present remuneration although actual
development of their lands would occur in the future.
Special treatment might well be accorded to commercial and industrial rights. Local service industries and commercial uses have the
odd characteristic that much of their value is due to localized population buildup that supports them. 190 Their profitability depends upon
neighboring residential development. Perhaps the local service industry and commercial development rights should then be allocated
evenly throughout a district, or perhaps on a mixed formula reflecting
both the acreage and the permissible density of each parcel. General
areas appropriate as sites for such uses could then be identified by performance standards or floating-zone techniques. The planning agency
might then publish a prospectus to developers on the kind of facility
desired, such as a neighborhood shopping center. The prospectus
would contain various criteria and performance standards that would
aid developers to bid on the project. After the planning authority
screening, eligible bids could be explained to and voted upon by the
landowners within the area to be served by the shopping center. The
developer elected by majority vote would then purchase service and
commercial industry rights from the property owners at the price
stated in his bid and proceed with development.
Alternatively, the planning agency might hold all industrial and
commercial rights in reserve and phase industrial and commercial
development as needed, using competitive bidding. Proceeds resulting from the sale of industrial and commercial rights could then be
distributed to landowners over an appropriate area, perhaps reflecting
188.
189.
190.

See notes 142 & 170 supra.
See discussion and cases cited pp. 41-42, 93-94 supra.
See pp. 40-41 supra.

1974)

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT

RIGHTS

various aspects of externality theory. The result in either case would
be comparable to a special assessment system in reverse, with monetary
benefits generated and distributed.
These systems would serve to redistribute the profits from highvalue commercial and industrial zoning that presently accrue to a
few fortunate landowners, at least in part at the expense of the vast
bulk of landowners whose land is zoned residential. Beyond this kind
of redistribution, it is anticipated that the net profit derived from
total development within the district may be higher under a development rights system than under present practices. Development rights
are transferable and thus ideally suited for use in, for example, cluster
zoning or planned unit developments. Under these devices, development densities allocated to a particular tract may be clustered together, instead of spread uniformly on cookie-cutter lots. Clustering
leaves part of a tract undeveloped, and within the developed portion,
achieves economic efficiencies by permitting shorter roads and utility
conduits, by the erection of townhouses or more dense multiple
x
dwellings and by a variety of other cost-saving techniques.19
Such practices often become more desirable when more land area
is included, and it can thus be good practice to block several tracts
for common development. This can be and is done presently but
could be aided and even promoted by a development rights system.
The process of assembling tracts would at least be expedited if the
landowners were accustomed to thinking in terms of the purchase
and sale of development rights at the going rate within the development district. A fixed number of rights, each with readily ascertainable
value, should puncture the assertions of inflated value that landowners presently make and should thus facilitate negotiations for the assemblage of tracts. Beyond this, a variety of incentives might be offered.
For instance, assume that several contiguous landowners have combined their holdings and intended to undertake a common development
project that is highly desirable from a planning perspective. In addition to being allowed to cluster densities, they might be allowed to
make use of the service and commercial industry rights represented
by their combined tracts. Further, they might be given a small density
and development rights bonus out of a limited fund reserved for
such purposes.
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191. See generally Chrinko v. South Brunswick Township Planning Bd., 187
A.2d 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1963); Symposium-Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 3 (1965).
192. A logical extension of incentives to encourage the blocking up of tracts
for common development would be to suggest devices for the compulsory unitization
of tracts of land for development purposes. See generally pp. 85-94 supra, discussing
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CONCLUSION

The preceding thoughts are but a tentative outline of how a development rights system might function. Structures such as those
sketched would be a major step forward from existing legal precedent.
That is not to say, however, that they would be alien to existing
precedent or inconceivable under it.
Each of the areas of precedent surveyed earlier involved pressing
social values. These values derived from resource uses involving
numerous tracts of privately owned land. Furtherance of the valued
resource uses required that the full attributes of individual ownership be modified by or subordinated to a legislatively imposed form
of limited common ownership. This the courts approved in various
instances as permissible usage of the powers of eminent domain,
taxation and police power regulation. The fundamental rationales
behind these exercises of governmental power were the proper and
needful development of resources, the prevention of the waste of resources and the protection and furtherance of correlative ownership
rights in commonly enjoyed resources. Perhaps the best epithet by
which to characterize the net effect of such permissible regulation on
the rights of individual owners is from Mr. Justice Holmes-that such
systems must be conducive to an "average reciprocity of advantage.'13
It is a fair question whether the shift to development rights is not
a more rigorous, onerous cure than is necessary. Could not the problems depicted be overcome by less drastic means?
Ill-timed, land-consumptive, sprawling development may be at
least partially controlled by zoning techniques and by adroit manipulations of the availability of services. Development of naturally
these practices with respect to oil and gas production. The existence of transferable
development rights should facilitate the unitization of land for development purposes
by making the owner's rights more specific and certain. Other advantages suggest
themselves, along with additional doctrinal extensions, but it seems impolitic to explore
these until the fundamental notion of development rights gains some acceptance and
experience in use.
193. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922), in which the Court approved
a Pennsylvania statute authorizing a property owner constructing a party wall to
demolish and rebuild a neighbor's boundaryline wall, if it could not be incorporated
into the new party wall; liability to the neighbor arose only in case of negligence
during the operation. The Court at one point analogized the statute to those reviewed
in Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606 (1885), and Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,
164 U.S. 112 (1896), characterizing all as involving the police power. 260 U.S. at 30.
See note 99 supra. Later in the opinion, however, the Court observed that the statute
codified the rights of party-wall owners as understood from colonial times in Pennsylvania and, as settled laws of property, did not involve any invocation of the police
power. Id. at 31. We previously noted judicial leniency toward ancient practices and
their statutory codifications in the case of turnpikes, pp. 53-55 supra, and in the case
of milldam acts, pp. 58-60 supra.
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hazardous or valuable areas may be partially controlled by special
regulations. Open space may be purchased by a variety of techniques,
assuming that funds are available. Some sort of compensation
mechanism might be engrafted onto police power controls to avoid
the taking issue and to adjust some of the shifts that occur in land
value. The reply to these suggestions is that each is a partial and
piecemeal response and that each contains major if not incapacitating
flaws. The problems addressed are interrelated and must be confronted as such. The use of a wide array of control devices, even if all were
individually effective, presupposes that each device will be managed
to achieve maximum potential effect and that the devices will be
properly coordinated to achieve interrelated ends. Experienced observers of local governmental efforts to regulate land use will likely be
skeptical on both counts. By contrast, the development rights system
gives promise of providing a unified method that can simultaneously
confront and curb all of the major problems that have been discussed.
Conversion of the development potential of land ownership into
development rights would probably require action by the state legislature. The evils to be avoided by such legislation would need to be
stated clearly and credibly, and backed by major studies. Planners and
natural and social scientists would have to be heavily involved in
these efforts. The studies should demonstrate in the most lucid manner
possible the costs and wastes of present development practices-for
example, the consumption of land area, the development of areas that
should be preserved or left undeveloped, and the public capital costs
of scattered and sprawling development. Both short- and long-term
waste of land resources should be depicted fully, vividly and accurately,
perhaps with analogies drawn to the practices that once existed in oil
and gas production. The studies should further show how these wastes
could be curbed by the utilization of development rights. Major effort
should be made to demonstrate that the present waste of resources
may have compound effects in the future by foreclosing options and
preventing multiplier effects of resource use.
The discussion of detrimental effects (waste) to be avoided should
be complemented by a well-documented analysis of desirable ends to
be gained by better regulation. It may very well be that if present
practices are altered, not only will waste be avoided but positive resource multiplier effects will be preserved or set into motion. For instance, preservation of groundwater recharge areas from development
may not simply preserve an aquifer. It may also allow the development
of groundwater-based agriculture that produces crops, preserves open
space and encourages wildlife propagation.
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Other studies should concentrate on the correlative rights of
numerous landowners as they are presently served by zoning and as
they might be better served by the development rights system. The
assertions made in this article about the destruction, creation, transfer
and bestowal of value by zoning practices should be fully verified and
documented. Special attention should be given to the precise dimensions of the taking problem. In both cases, the adjustments of entitlements and the avoidance of inequities that would hopefully result from
the use of development rights should be fully explored. Additionally,
special studies should be made of the economies possible through such
devices as cluster development, planned unit development and any
similar systems that may have emerged, in order to depict fully the
economies of development that are possible using the transfer methods
implicit in the development rights system. Throughout the suggested
studies, analogies should be drawn to the protection and furtherance
of correlative rights that have been approved in legal precedent.
An interdisciplinary team of economists, experienced land developers, financiers, planners, lawyers and physical scientists should be
assigned the task of developing several model structures for (1) the
creation and precise legal and technical definition of development
rights, including a thorough analysis of tax consequences and recording problems, and (2) management of the market place structure for
the sale and exchange of development rights. In constructing these
models, the team should consider whether a development rights system would be adaptable to areas that are partially or fully developed.
Additional considerations include whether total development densities
within a district could be estimated at the outset and density figures
maintained inviolate thereafter as a basis for the number of development rights allocated, whether blocs of rights must be held in reserve
for later allocation and whether dividend bonuses of rights might
be allocated among the holders of rights if density figures were revised upwards. Provisions to deter the speculative acquisition of large
blocs of rights might also be needed. These lines of inquiry are but
a partial listing of potential difficulties that would have to be analyzed.
A major line of inquiry, perhaps to be addressed initially by this team
and eventually by the legislature, is that of the structural nature, precise powers and accountability of the planning agency that will run
the districts. For it is apparent that the development rights system
would envisage a planning agency with control and management powers far beyond any that presently exist in this country.
The various model structures developed by the team should be
subjected to the most intense and probing analysis possible, with
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an eye toward developing a final model that offers the best chance
of functioning desirably and predictably. The model chosen should
give the best possible assurance of proper internal functioning and
should also be clearly calculated to serve the goals discussed earlierprevention of identified resource wastes, protection of values by wise
land management and protection of correlative rights of landowners.
The planning studies and the selected development rights model
should then be presented to the legislature, accompanied by a proposed statute carefully drafted to translate the model into law. Plans
should also be laid to generate impetus for the passage of the statute.
Once passage is achieved, any early court cases that present fundamental questions and opportunity for review of the basic structure
and purposes of the development rights system must be very carefully
and ably shepherded through the appellate courts to assure favorable
decision.
Legal precedent exists in sufficient breadth and strength to provide
strong encouragement to those considering development rights systems as methods of widespread land use control. Judicial approval is
not assured but can realistically be hoped for if the systems are well
considered and well structured, if they are clearly responsive to the
major short- and long-term wastes of land and other resources that
occur under the present systems of land use controls, and if their impact on the rights of individual landowners is in clear furtherance
both of demonstrable public interests and of the correlative rights
and entitlements of individual owners. The fundamental obstacles to
such a plan are more those of legislative perception and resolve, resource exigency, political reality and the creation of workable planning
and marketing structures, than of legal precedent.

